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ABSTRACT

This Article provides a critical appraisalof the newly adopted
African IDPs Convention. In particular, it offers a detailed
analysis of the Convention's transformation of the UN Guiding
Principles into legally binding rules for the management of the
phenomenon of internal displacement in Africa. By definition,
internally displaced persons (IDPs) are persons who have not
crossed international frontiers and are citizens of the state
within which they find themselves. Although their conditions
may be similar to refugees, who are necessarily aliens to the host
community, their legal status is not analogous. At the most
basic level, there is no doctrinal agreement on whether "IDP"is
a legal status at all. This has created a fundamental doctrinal
dilemma. The Article analyzes the merits of the arguments for
and againstaccordingIDPs a distinctive legal status analogous
to refugees. It also provides a detailed discussion of the
important provisions that define the rights and responsibilities
of IDPs and the various state and non-state actors during the
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three most important phases-before displacement, during
displacement, and after return.
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I. INTRODUCTION

International law relating to forced displacement developed in
the context of refugee status.' Refugee law accords a distinct and

The most important sources of international refugee law are the U.N.
1.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150
[hereinafter UN Refugees Convention] (eliminating the geographic and temporal
limitations of the Convention's application); U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (extending the UN Refugees Convention's
protection to people made refugees due to events occurring after January 1, 1951);
Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, G.A. Res.
428 (V), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 46, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (Dec. 14, 1950)
[hereinafter Statute of the UNHCR]; and Organization of African Unity, Convention
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Sept. 10, 1969, 1001
U.N.T.S 45 [hereinafter African Refugee Convention]; GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL & JANE
McADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 15-32 (3d ed. 2007) (detailing how the
term "refugee" has evolved through the years, thereby extending the availability of
protections in international law). Other leading resources on the law of refugee status
and asylum include: DEBORAH E. ANKER, THE LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES
(3d ed. 1999 & Supp. 2002); 2 ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1972); 1 ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1966); JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER
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recognizable legal status to an individual who is outside of her
country of origin or habitual residence if the receiving authorities
determine that she meets an individualized legal definition. 2 As
forced migration grew in size and complexity,3 the inability of this
individualistic legal regime to meaningfully address the problem
became increasingly clear.4 Over the last several decades, a series of
UN General Assembly resolutions authorized the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to provide assistance to large
groups of "refugees" on the basis of prima facie group status
determination rather than case-by-case adjudication.5 Gradually,

INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005) [hereinafter HATHAWAY, RIGHTS OF REFUGEES]; JAMES C.
HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS (1991) [hereinafter HATHAWAY, REFUGEE
STATUS]; DAVID A. MARTIN ET AL., FORCED MIGRATION: LAW AND POLICY (2007); KAREN
MUSALO ET AL., REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY: A COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL
APPROACH (3d ed. 2007).

See UN Refugees Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(A)(2) (defining a refugee
2.
as someone outside the refugee's country and unable or unwilling to return because of a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, political
opinion, or belongingness in a particular social group). The Statute of the UNHCR also
defines a refugee in similar terms. Statute of the UNCHR, supra note 1, art. 6(A)(ii)
(defining a refugee as someone outside the refugee's own country, unable or unwilling
to return for reasons other than personal convenience).
3.
When the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) agency was
created in 1950 to deal with the aftermath of WWII, it was given a three-year mandate
and a budget of $300,000. History of UNHCR, UNHCR-THE U.N. REFUGEE AGENCY,
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646cbc.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2011). Sixty years
later, it now assists more than 34 million persons of concern in 118 countries with a
budget of more than $2 billion. Id. Most of the beneficiaries do not meet the definition
of a refugee under the Refugee Convention or the Statute of the UNHCR. See id.
(noting the Commissioner's increasingly important role in helping internally displaced
persons).
One of the earliest indications of the inadequacy of the individualistic
4.
definition to address world refugee problems came in 1957. The status of large
numbers of mainland Chinese in Hong Kong was controverted as a result of the
existence of two Chinas because either one of them could have legitimately assumed
the role of protection. See GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 1, at 24 (citing
EDWARD I. HAMBRO, THE PROBLEM OF CHINESE REFUGEES IN HONG KONG: REPORT
SUBMITTED TO THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (1955))

(allowing the Commissioner to use his discretion since the refugees "technically" were
not refugees under the Statute of the UNHCR as they were still within their own
country). To avoid the legal quagmire, the UN General Assembly authorized the
Commissioner to "use his good offices to encourage arrangements for contributions."
See G.A. Res. 1167, U.N. GAOR, 12th Sess., Supp. No. 11, U.N. Doc. A/3585/Rev.1, at
20 (Nov. 26, 1957) (granting power to the Commissioner to take action in response to
the Chinese refugee problem in Hong Kong). This was considered to be an "effective
[and] pragmatic solution" to the problem. GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 1, at
24.

See GoODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 1, at 26 (explaining that, while
5.
it might be difficult to establish a "well-founded fear" on an individual basis, a group
approach, focused on the lack of protection, will avoid the shortcomings of a legal
definition). See also History of UNHCR, supra note 3 (detailing how the role of the
UNHCR has evolved through the years). To address this problem in the African
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protection and assistance extended to include persons who are
displaced within their own countries and find themselves in refugeelike situations.6 Although most Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)
share similar factual circumstances with refugees, the international
legal regime for the protection of refugees is not readily adaptable to
their situation because of some serious doctrinal hurdles-mainly
sovereignty. 7
When the exigencies of internal displacement began to demand
serious international attention, the community of nations, acting
through the UN, opted to adopt the nonbinding Guiding Principles on
Internal Displacements (the UN Guiding Principles), rather than

context, the African Organization of Unity (commonly referred to as the African Union)
adopted the African Refugee Convention, which adopts the prima facie group status
approach. See African Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(2).
The term "refugee" shall also apply to every person who, owing to external
aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public
order in either part of the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is
compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in
another place outside his country of origin or nationality.
Id.
6.
See IDPs-Policy and Guiding Documents, UNHCR-THE U.N. REFUGEE
AGENCY, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646cl49.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2011)
(commenting on the evolution of the role of the UNHCR in regards to internally
displaced persons).
"The problem is sovereignty," said former UN High Commissioner for
7.
Refugees, Sadako Ogata, when she was asked why her agency, the UNHCR, had not
been able to lend more help to IDPs. UNHCR, STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES 2006:
HUMAN DISPLACEMENT IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 160 (2006) (citing DAVID A. KORN,
EXODUS WITHIN BORDERS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CRISIS OF INTERNAL

DISPLACEMENT 49 (1999)); see also James C. Hathaway, Forced Migration Studies:
Could We Agree Just to 'Date?,' 20 J. REFUGEE STUD. 349, 353 (2007) ("Despite the
often attenuated nature of sovereign power today, it remains the case that a clear
guarantee of rights can only be made to persons who are outside of their own country."
(emphasis omitted)). For a critique of Professor Hathaway's main thesis, see infra Part
III.
See Comm'n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Special Representative of the
8.
Secretary-General, Francis M. Deng, submitted pursuant to Commission Resolution
1997/39 on the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1998/53/add2 (Feb. 11, 1998) [hereinafter Guiding Principles], available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.1998.53.Add.2.En?Open
document (adopting the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement). The Secretary
General of the UN appointed Dr. Francis Deng as his Special Representative on
Internally Displaced Persons in 1992. The consultative process, which took more than a
decade, yielded the Guiding Principles that were adopted by about 190 states as "an
important international framework" for the protection of IDPs in 2005. See Roberta
Cohen & Francis M. Deng, The Genesis and the Challenges, FOREIGN MIGRATION REV.,
Dec. 2008, at 4-5, http://www.fmreview.org/ FMRpdfs/GP10/GP1O.pdf (explaining that
the states adopted the World Summit Outcome document, which recognizes the
importance of the Guiding Principles). One of the main drafters of the Principles and
author of the Annotations, Professor Walter Kalin, notes that although the Principles
do not constitute a binding instrument, they are consistent with existing international
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confront the doctrinal problem and adopt a legally binding
instrument. The African Union Convention for the Protection and
Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons9 (the AU Convention) is a
unique and bold measure designed to convert the nonbinding UN
Guiding Principles into a binding legal instrument that defines rights
and responsibilities.' 0 The AU Convention is the first legally binding
continental instrument" that effectively transforms the operational
IDP category into a definite legal status.12

law. He also acknowledges that they are not a mere restatement of existing law.
WALTER KALIN, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT: ANNOTATIONS
(2000). The Annotations are also available at The Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement, THE BROOKINGS INST., http://www.brookings.edu/projects/idp/gppage.aspx (last visited Jan. 5, 2011).
African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally
9.
Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention), Oct. 23, 2009 [hereinafter AU
Convention],
http://www.africa-union.org/root/AR/index/Convention%20on%20IDPs%
20_Eng_%20-%20Final.pdf.
The AU Convention is almost completely based on the UN Guiding
10.
Principles on Internal Displacement. See id. pmbl. (recognizing the importance of the
Guiding Principles for the protection of IDPs).
To be precise, the first legally binding multilateral treaty is a sub-regional
11.
instrument adopted by eleven countries of the Great Lakes region. See Int'l Conference
on the Great Lakes Region, Protocol on the Protection and Assistance of Internally
Displaced Persons, Nov. 30, 2006, http://www.brookings.edu/fp/projects/idp/Great
Lakes IDPprotocol.pdf (committing to following the Guiding Principles, but also
acknowledging that "there is no specific coherent international or regional legal regime
and institution mandated to provide protection and assistance to internally displaced
persons").
12.
Professor Walter Kalin, in his Annotations of the Guiding Principles, notes
that "[b]ecoming displaced within one's own country of origin or country of habitual
residence does not confer special legal status in the same sense as, say, becoming a
refugee does." KALIN, supra note 8, at 2. He adds that paragraph 2 of the Guiding
Principles, which purports to identify IDPs, is not a legal definition, but rather it is a
mere description of an operational category. Id. at 2-3. As evidence of this supposition,
he cites to the fact that the term "internally displaced persons" is placed in the
introductory section of the Guiding Principles rather than under the definition of terms
in the main body. Id. He concludes by saying that "the Guiding Principles seek to
highlight the descriptive and non-legal nature of the term 'internally displaced
persons.' Internally displaced persons need not and cannot be granted a special legal
status comparable to refugee status." Id. The AU Convention clears up this confusion
by providing a legal definition of IDPs. It provides that:
Internally Displaced Persons means persons or groups of persons who have
been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual
residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed
conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or
natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally
recognized State border.
AU Convention, supra note 9, art. 1(k). This definition is taken from the Guiding
Principles in its entirety and converted into a legal definition. See Guiding Principles,
supra note 8, Intro. T 2 (using identical language to define an IDP).
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Like the UN Guiding Principles, the AU Convention's
substantive provisions are predicated on three main sources of
international law: human rights law,1 3 humanitarian law, 14 and

13.
The principal human rights instrument that the AU Convention draws
from is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (II) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. Most of its provisions are believed
to have risen to the level of customary international law. See, e.g., Thomas
Buergenthal, InternationalHuman Rights Law and Institutions: Accomplishments and
Prospects, 63 WASH. L. REV. 1, 9 (1988) (explaining that various specific rights in the
UDHR have acquired the status of customary international law, thereby imposing
additional legal obligations). The UDHR has been translated into 375 languages; all of
the translations and other UDHR materials are available online. UniversalDeclaration
of Human Rights: Introduction, UN HUMAN RIGHTS-OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM'R FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org/ENIUDHR/Pages/Introduction.aspx (last visited
Jan. 5, 2011). Other important sources of human rights law include the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter
ICCPR]; and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCRI.
14.
The term "international humanitarian law," or jus in bello, represents in its
current usage all rules of international law designed to govern the treatment of
persons, civilian or military, active, inactive, sick, or wounded in armed conflict. HansPeter Gasser writes that international humanitarian law is not "a cohesive body of law,
but a category of separate legal. . . proscriptions. . . ." M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & PETER
MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA 441 (1996) (citing Hans-Peter Gasser, International HumanitarianLaw,
Introduction to HANS HAUG, HUMANITY FOR ALL 1, 3 (1993)). Most rules of current
importance are contained in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949: Geneva Convention
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the
Field, arts. 31-83, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded,
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, arts. 85-133, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention
Relevant to the Treatment of Prisoners of War arts. 135-285, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, arts. 287-417, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]. The two
Additional Protocols of 1977 also bear mentioning: Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), arts. 3-608, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflict
(Protocol II), arts. 1-28, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. International humanitarian
law also comprises a set of rules formerly known as the Laws of War contained in the
Hague Conventions of 1907. The Hague Conventions are reprinted in ADAM ROBERTS &
RICHARD GUELFF, DOCUMENTS IN THE LAWS OF WAR 87-94 (3d ed. 2000). More recent
instruments include the Inhumane Weapons Convention of 1980. UN Convention on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May
Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, arts. 137255, Apr. 10, 1981, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137.
This set of rules is distinct from the body of rules governing the legitimacy of the
resort to force, often referred to as the jus ad bellum, which is essentially based on
paragraph 4 of Article 2 as well as Articles 39-51 (Chapter VII) of the United Nations
Charter. Cf. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4, 39-51 (providing the treaty requirements for
when a nation may justifiably engage in war); see generally INT'L COMM. OF THE RED
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refugee law.1 5 While the UN Guiding Principles are limited to
restating and readopting rights and responsibilities and identifying
gaps in the law, the AU Convention goes further, creating a new
international legal status and establishing new rights and
responsibilities. In so doing, it defies conventional classifications and
directly confronts the serious doctrinal dilemma that the UN has
avoided for so long.
This Article critically appraises the AU Convention's
transformation of the UN Guiding Principles into legally binding
rules to manage IDPs in Africa. It is divided into five parts. The AU
Convention's rights-based approach emphasizes the causes of
displacement and the categories of displaced persons. As such, Part
II summarizes the most common causes of displacement and the
various categories of displaced persons in Africa. By definition,
internally displaced persons are persons who have not crossed
international borders and are citizens of the state within which they
find themselves. 16 Although their conditions may be similar to
refugees, who are necessarily aliens to the host community,' 7 their
legal status is not analogous. At the most basic level, there is no
doctrinal agreement on whether "IDP" is a legal status at all. Part III
tackles this fundamental doctrinal dilemma. Part IV discusses in
detail the important provisions that define the rights and
responsibilities of IDPs and various states and non-state actors before
displacement, during displacement, and after return. Part IV also
compares the AU Convention and the UN Guiding Principles. Part V
concludes by providing a general assessment of the nature and
significance of the AU Convention.

CROSS [ICRC], PUB. No. 0365, BASIC RULES OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND THEIR

ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS (1988) (providing a synthesis of the international legal
framework contained in the Geneva Conventions and its protocols regarding the rules
of international humanitarian law during armed conflicts); FRITS KALSHOVEN &
LIESBETH ZEGVELD, CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR: AN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross 2001) (1987)
(discussing the principal rules of humanitarian law with a focus on the rules governing
weapons and the field of international criminal law); George H. Aldrich, The Law of
War on Land, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 42, 42-63 (2000) (explaining how the different
conventions apply to combat scenarios).
15.
See supra note 1 (listing the most important sources in international
refugee law).
16.
See AU Convention, supra note 9, art. 1(k) (characterizing IDPs as persons
not having crossed an "internationally recognized State border").
17.
See UN Refugees Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(A)(1)-(2) (conditioning
refugee status on "being outside the country of his former habitual residence").
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II. CAUSES OF DISPLACEMENT AND CATEGORIES OF
DISPLACED PERSONS IN AFRICA

Understanding the root causes of African displacement is
essential in assessing the legal solution that the AU Convention
envisages. This section briefly surveys the causes of displacement in
the major displacement regions of Africa and outlines the various
categories of displaced persons.
A. Causes of Displacement
The UNHCR estimates that, as of the end of 2008, there were
about 42 million forcibly displaced individuals around the world.' 8
This figure includes 15.2 million refugees,19 827,000 asylum
seekers, 20 and 26 million IDPs.2 1 The causes of internal and external
displacement and the patterns of movement are complex and often
related. This section identifies the important causes and highlights
the complexity of the phenomenon of forced displacement and the
difficulty it poses for legal classification.
1.

Armed Conflict and Human Rights Violations

i.

In General

Armed conflict and human rights violations are the most
commonly known causes of displacement. 22 The UNHCR's 2008
Global Trends Report indicates that half of the world's refugees today
were forced out of their homes because of armed conflict linked to the

18.
See UNHCR, 2008 GLOBAL TRENDS: REFUGEES, ASYLUM-SEEKERS,
PERSONS 2 (2009),
RETURNEES,
INTERNALLY DISPLACED AND STATELESS
http://www.unher.org/4a375c426.html.
19.
UNHCR's usage of the term "refugee" is not limited to those who meet the
individualistic definition under the Refugee Convention. This issue is discussed in
some detail infra Part Il.b.iii.
20.
Doctrinally this is a key category. It represents a subset of refugees who
meet the individualistic criteria under the Refugee Convention or the Statute of the
UNHCR. Issues surrounding this category are discussed in some detail infra Part
II.b.iv.
21.
UNHCR, supranote 18, at 2.
22.
See UNHCR, supra note 7, at 9-10 (explaining that human rights
violations and war continue to cause internal displacement among hundreds of
thousands of people every year). During this decade, although about thirteen
displacement-inducing Cold War-era conflicts were contained, six armed conflicts
emerged or resurfaced, some of them linked to the "global war on terror." Id. at 10.
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"war on terror."2 3 With 1.8 million refugees, Pakistan is currently
host to the largest number of refugees in the world. 24 It is followed by
Syria with 1.1 million and Iran with 980,000 refugees. 25 Nearly all of
these refugees come from either Iraq or Afghanistan, and they
represent almost half of the refugees under the protection of the
UNHCR worldwide. 26 Iraq, one of the largest refugee-creating
countries, with an estimated 1.9 million of its citizens in neighboring
countries,2 7 also hosts 2.4 million IDPs who were driven from their
homes due to the same causes. 28
In Africa, at least half of the countries and 20 percent of the
continent's population have been affected by frequent armed
conflict.2 9 Although, with the exception of the 1998-2000 EthiopiaEritrea border war, it is difficult to classify the nature of these
conflicts, almost all could be classified as unconventional or low-tech
factional conflicts that often target civilian populations.30 Almost all
African countries have been implicated in serious human rights
violations. 3 '
Although the number of African refugees has decreased in the
last seven years as a result of the conclusion of several long-standing
armed conflicts, there are still 2.1 million refugees across the
continent.32 The countries that remain most affected by displacement
include the Central African Republic (the CAR), Chad, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (the DRC), Somalia, and Sudan.3 3
The pattern of internal displacement mirrors the pattern of refugee
23.
See UNHCR, supra note 18, at 2 ("Afghan and Iraqi refugees account for
almost half of all refugees under UNHCR's responsibility worldwide.").
24.
Id.
25.
Id.
26.
See id. at 9 (noting that 96 percent of Afghan refugees were located in
Pakistan and Iran, while the majority of Iraqi refugees sought refuge in neighboring
countries as well).
27.
Id. at 2.
28.
See id. at 19 (providing that almost 1.4 million Iraqis have been displaced
as a consequence of the war).
Int'l Fed'n of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies [IFRC], Humanitarian
29.
Trends and Red Cross and Red Crescent Future Priorities in Africa 11 (2004)
available at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/52285580/
(unpublished manuscript),
Humanitarian-Trends-and-Red-CrossCrescent-Future-Priorities-in-Africa.
Cf. id (discussing the ways in which "[t]he British Government has
30.
categorized [such] conflicts over the last decade").
See 2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-Africa,U.S. DEP'T
31.
OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/af/index.htm (last visited Jan. 5,
2011) (providing reports submitted to Congress by the State Department "regarding
the status of internationally recognized human rights" in countries in Africa).
This is because of successful repatriation of refugees to Burundi (95,400),
32.
Southern Sudan (90,100), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (54,000), and Angola
(13,100). UNHCR, supranote 18, at 8.
See id. (noting that renewed armed conflict and human rights violations led
33.
to an outflow of more than 200,000 people from these countries).
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outflow. 3 4 The number of IDPs under the care of the UNHCR in
Africa is estimated to be roughly 14.4 million, about double the
number of refugees that the UNHCR cares for worldwide.35
At the request of the UN, the Geneva-based Internal
Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC) meticulously maintains
data on conflict-induced internal displacement in fifty-two
countries. 36 IDMC data shows that 11.6 million IDPs reside in
Africa-nearly half of the world's IDP population.37 The data also
shows that displacement is not static. For example, in 2008, nearly
4.6 million people were displaced in twenty-four countries as a result
of new armed conflicts, while roughly 2.6 million IDPs returned to
their homes.38 Uganda, the DRC, Sudan, Kenya, and the Philippines
experienced large-scale returns of 200,000 IDPs or more. 39 Most
notably, all of these countries, with the exception of Uganda,
experienced large-scale refugee outflow at the same time they were
welcoming returnees. 40
According to the UNHCR, large-scale voluntary repatriation of
41
refugees is commonly accompanied by large-scale refugee outflow.
For example, in 2004, as 10,300 Somali refugees voluntarily returned
42
home, more Somali refugees fled to Kenya, Tanzania, and Yemen.
During the same year, while approximately 21,000 Liberian refugees
returned to Liberia from C6te d'Ivoire, another group of about 87,000

See UNHCR, supra note 7, at 14 (noting that many countries were
34.
experiencing additional refugee displacements, but at the same time refugees were
returning home); see also discussion infra Part II.1.ii (analyzing the in-and-out flows of
refugees for several African countries).
35.
The total IDP population is about 26 million, however, UNHCR currently
provides protection and assistance to about half of this population. See UNHCR, supra
note 18, at 19 (noting that out of 26 million IDPs, the UNHCR had only been able to
provide assistance to around 14.4 million).
36.
Comprehensive data and other IDP-related information is available on the
official website of the IDMC. See IDMC, http://www.internal-displacement.org (last
visited Jan. 5, 2011). The request from the UN is noted at the "About Us" tab. About
Us, IDMC, http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708FO04BDODA/(httpSection
Homepages)/$first?OpenDocument&count=1000 (last visited Jan. 5, 2011).
IDMC, INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT: GLOBAL OVERVIEW OF TRENDS AND
37.
DEVELOPMENT IN 2008, at 29 (2009), http://www.internal-displacement.org/
8025708FO04BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/82DA6A2DE4C7BA41C12575A90041E6A8/$file/ID
MC_Internal_DisplacementGlobalOverview_- 2008.pdf.
See id. at 9 (listing the total number of IDPs at 26 million, out of which 11.6
38.
million reside in Africa).
Id.
39.
See id. at 8 (listing the DRC, Sudan, and Kenya among the countries with
40.
at least 200,000 newly displaced people in 2008, while the corresponding number for
Uganda falls somewhere between 80,000 and 200,000).
See UNHCR, supra note 7, at 14 ("In a number of countries, new refugee
41.
displacements were taking place at the same time as large-scale voluntary
repatriations.").
Id.
42.
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new refugees fled to C6te d'Ivoire.4 3 Significantly, while C6te d'Ivoire
was repatriating some Liberian refugees and receiving other Liberian
refugees, about 22,200 of its own citizens sought refuge in Liberia and
Guinea.44
It is thus quite possible, and in fact most likely, that an
individual could be an IDP today, a refugee tomorrow, and an IDP
again the day after, depending on how quickly the circumstances
force them to move. The difficulty of classifying forcibly displaced
persons into distinct legal categories is often complicated by the
absence of recognizable boundaries and the fact that the conflicts that
cause the displacement do not "correspond to the state or judicial
boundaries."4 5 The late Sir Ian Brownlie, who is perhaps the utmost
authority on African colonial boundaries, wrote:
In the majority of instances African frontiers divide tribes or
language groups. The better known examples include the division of
the Masai between Kenya and Tanzania and the Ewa between Togo
and Ghana. Boundary making in the period of European expansion in
Africa took place in circumstances which generally militated against
reference to tribal or ethnological considerations. Political bargaining
involved the construction of parcels of territory upon broad principles
evidenced geographically by liberal resort to straight lines and general
features such as drainage basins and watersheds. Within a framework
of overall political bargaining, the accidents of prior exploration and
military penetration were often to determine delimitation as between
46
Britain, France and Germany.

The

motives

behind

these

boundary-making

tactics

are

complicated and irrelevant to the present inquiry. It is important,
however, to understand the complexity involved in defining the
boundaries and, as such, in defining nationality for the purpose of
rights-based legal classification. Although Sir Brownlie noted that
the Europeans mostly failed to consider ethnography when they
delimited African boundaries, he also emphasized the difficulty that
the Europeans faced wherever they tried to do so: "The determination
of the principles of association by means of which a group can be
designated as a tribe, people or nation may be a matter of notorious
difficulty ... [and] in certain situations the sorting out of groups may

43.
44.
45.
region, see

Id.
Id.
For a good discussion of the conflict situations in the African Great Lakes
CTR. ON INT'L COOPERATION, REGIONAL CONFLICT FORMATION IN THE GREAT

LAKES REGION OF AFRICA: STRUCTURE, DYNAMICS AND CHALLENGES FOR POLICY 5

(Barnett R. Rubin et al. eds., 2001), http://www.cic.nyu.edu/peacebuildingloldpdfs/
RCFNAIROBI.pdf (summarizing the regional conflicts in the Great Lakes region and
how a revised model could increase the likelihood of bettering conflict management).
46.
See IAN BROWNLIE, AFRICAN BOUNDARIES, A LEGAL AND DIPLOMATIC
ENCYCLOPEDIA 6 (1979). Brownlie does not fail to acknowledge that tribal or
ethnographic considerations were taken into account in certain areas. See id. at 6-7.
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be difficult and perhaps impossible." 4 7 He then justified the decision
of the Organization of African Unity (now the African Union) to keep
the colonial boundaries:
The short point is that disturbance of a not very obvious 'rational'
status quo makes no sense if there is no rational substitute to be found.
Arbitrariness often exists because the facts are confused and lack
definition. Hence the policy of the OAU favoring the colonial status quo
48
(as a general principle) has a great deal of good sense behind it.

These artificial boundarieS 49 became a constant source of conflict
in some parts of Africa while remaining largely irrelevant in other
areas. For example, the long-standing conflict in the Great Lakes
region of Africa is virtually unconstrained by any real or imaginary
national frontiers. Conflicts experts state that, at its peak, the
conflict in that region involved not only Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi,
and the DRC-states that are geographically considered to belong to
the Great Lakes region-but also Angola, the CAR, Chad, Congo,
Namibia, Sudan, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe.5 0 According to New York
University's Center on International Cooperation, contemporary
armed conflicts are "neither 'local', 'civil,' nor 'intra-state' as is widely
held, and can transgress national boundaries."5 1 They are largely
influenced by
regional and global political, military, economic, and social networks.
Global factors, like the policies of external states, corporations, and
development and financial institutions, can aggravate regional conflict
processes, such as the cross-border migration of refugees, civilians, and
armed groups. Covert alliances and illegal trade networks linked to
global markets can exacerbate the interaction of global and regional
forces, especially when states are weak or illegitimate and citizenship is
52
contested.

Moreover, about 54 percent of the typical displaced population in
Africa consists of children under the age of eighteen, and some of
these children are born in displacement camps with uncertain
citizenship status.5 3 Under these circumstances, keeping track of the

47.

Id. at 7.

Id.
48.
49.
Most of the boundaries were drawn at the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885.
See, e.g., IEUAN L.I. GRIFFITHS, THE AFRICAN INHERITANCE 34-45 (1995) (detailing
"The European Partition of Africa" beginning in 1884); THOMAS PAKENHAM, THE
SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA 1876-1912, at 239-55 (1991) (describing the process of dividing
the African continent between the dominant colonial powers).
50. - CTR. ON INT'L COOPERATION, supra note 45, at 6.
Id. at 5.
51.
52.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
See id.; see also UNHCR, supra note 7, at 20, 22, (explaining that 54
53.
percent of African displaced persons are children, and 36 percent of the UNHCR's
population of concern resides in camps or centers). By contrast, the number of refugee
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citizenship and legal status of persons who move within and across
these fluid boundaries could be a very difficult task.
ii.

Closer Look at the Conflict-Related Causes in Selected African
Countries

This section discusses the conflict and human rights-related
causes and the patterns of displacement in several African countries
with substantial numbers of IDPs and refugees.
a.

The Central African Republic

The CAR gained its independence from French colonial rule in
1960.54 Landlocked in the center of Africa, it shares boundaries with
Chad, Sudan, the DRC, Congo, and Cameroon. It is rich in diamonds,
uranium, and other minerals.5 5 With 60 percent of the total
population of about 4.5 million living in outlying areas, 56 the country
has not been able to overcome its colonial past and form a stable and
accountable government.57 The reasons for this failure are not
limited to its own internal problems.58
The UNHCR's most recent statistics show that it cares for
225,319 persons in the CAR. 59 This number includes 197,000 IDPs,
27,047 refugees, and 1,219 asylum seekers. Some of the refugees are
from neighboring countries including 5,000 refugees from Sudan,
1,600 from Chad, and 24,300 from the DRC. 60

children in Europe is about 25 percent of the total population, showing the selectivity
of the asylum systems in industrialized nations. Id. at 21-22.
54.
CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK: CENTRAL AFRICAN
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ct.html
REPUBLIC,
(last updated Dec. 14, 2010).
55.
Id.
See id. (providing that out of a population of 4,844,927 (est. July 2010), the
56.
urban population was 39 percent (est. 2008)).
See id. ('The government still does not fully control the countryside, where
57.
pockets of lawlessness persist.").
See Background Note: Central African Republic, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (Dec.
58.
28, 2010), http://www.state.gov/r/paleilbgn/4007.htm (explaining how the country's
colonial past and the presence of ethnicities continue to pose challenges for achieving
peace and stability in the CAR). The regional nature of the CAR's problems is
discussed in the subsections below. Compare discussion supra Part II.A.1.i, and infra
Part II.A.1.ii.b-h (explaining how the regional nature of conflicts in the Great Lakes
region causes disruption to spread from one country to another).
59.
See 2011 UNHCR Country Operations Profile: Central African Republic,
UNHCR-THE U.N. REFUGEE AGENCY, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page
?page=49e45cl56 (last visited Jan. 5, 2011) [hereinafter CAR Profile] (providing that
the current population of concern residing in the CAR equals 225,319 as of January
2010).
Id.
60.
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The internal and cross-border movement of persons are regional
phenomena linked to transnational conflicts, and they are often said
to be mutually reinforcing.6 1 For example, a recent displacement of
16,000 people, some of whom crossed into Chad, was caused by
fighting between government forces and rebel groups and an attack
by the Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army, which crossed into the CAR
and attacked areas not controlled by the government. 62
According to the IDMC, despite the presence of peacekeeping
forces in the CAR, IDPs have suffered a wide range of violations,
ranging from robbery to rape and killings, by all sorts of actors,
including government forces, internal and foreign rebel groups, and
bandits. 63 As will be shown below, some of the same groups of IDPs
and refugees are also found in the same conditions in the CAR's
neighboring countries. 64
b.

Chad

Chad gained its independence from French colonial rule in 1960
and has experienced constant unrest ever since in the form of civil
warfare and invasions from neighboring countries. 65 More than 75
percent of Chad's total population of 10.3 million reside in rural
outlying areas. 66 Over 80 percent of its labor force is involved in
agriculture, which is severely affected by climate change. 67 There are
more than 200 ethnic groups, and the country's ethnic diversity
exacerbates conflict situations. 68
The IDMC estimates the number of IDPs in Chad to be
180,000.69 The latest figures from the UNHCR indicate that it hosts
170,531 IDPs and around 338,495 refugees, which includes 262,900

61.
See generally CTR. ON INT'L COOPERATION, supra note 45, at 5 (describing
the mutually reinforcing nature of the conflicts in the Great Lakes region).
62.
CAR Profile, supranote 59.
63.
IDMC, supra note 37, at 38. In addition to the UN peacekeeping forces,
European Union forces monitor the border between the CAR and Chad "with a Security
Council mandate to protect refugees and IDPs affected by the spill-over of violence
from Darfur"). Id. at 38.
See discussion infra Part II.A.1-4 (elaborating on major causes that
64.
contribute to internal displacement such as violence, wars, and human rights
violations in the neighboring countries).
65.
CENT.
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
THE
WORLD FACTBOOK:
CHAD,
(last updated
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cd.html
Dec. 22, 2010).
Id. (providing that out of a population of 10,543,464 (est. July 2010), 27
66.
percent reside in urban areas (est. 2008)).
Background Note: Chad, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (Dec. 6, 2010),
67.
http://www.state.gov/r/paleilbgn/37992.htm.
68.
Id. (noting the presence of Darfur refugees).
IDMC, supra note 37, at 39.
69.
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from Sudan and 73,500 from the CAR.70 The IDMC concludes that
the major causes of internal displacement in Chad are internal and
international armed conflict, generalized violence, and human rights
violations.7 1 More than 3,000 European Union troops deployed in
eastern Chad now provide protection to IDPs and Sudanese
refugees. 7 2 The militarization of IDPs sites and gross violations of
the human rights of IDPs and refugees are common.7 3
c.

C6te d'Ivoire

C6te d'Ivoire was one of the most prosperous West African states
from 1960, the year it gained independence from French colonial rule,
until December 1999, when its first-ever military coup overthrew the
Since then, a
government and installed a military junta. 74
combination rebel uprising and civil war has threatened the country's
peace and stability, giving rise to serious social and economic
problems.7 5 In 2002, a failed coup divided the country into two
segments and caused massive internal and external population
displacements. 76
In 2004, the United Nations deployed about 6,200 UN
peacekeeping forces in C6te d'Ivoire.7 7 Despite the presence of this
large force, ethnic conflict and associated problems have made
repatriation of the displaced population difficult.7 8 The effect of the
ethnic conflict is not limited to the displacement of the local
population. It has also displaced migrant workers from neighboring
states. 79 According to the IDMC, about 621,000 people are still
internally displaced.80

2011 UNHCR Country Operations Profile: Chad, UNHCR-THE U.N.
70.
(last
REFUGEE AGENCY, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e45c226
visited Jan. 5, 2011) [hereinafter Chad Profile].
IDMC, supra note 37, at 39.
71.
Id.
72.
73.
Id.
74.
CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK: C6TE D'IVOIRE,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iv.html (last updated
Dec. 28, 2010).
75.
Id.
76.
Background Note: C6te d'Ivoire, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (July 16, 2010),
http://www.state.gov/r/paleilbgn/2846.htm.
77.
Year in Review 2004, UN PEACE OPERATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/
peacekeeping/publications/yir/2004/ch2.htm#unoci (last visited Jan. 5, 2011).

78.

Background Note: C6te d'Ivoire, supra note 76.

CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 74. Hopefully, this will not be
79.
permanent; a "March 2007 peace deal between Ivoirian rebels and the government
brought significant numbers of rebels out of hiding in neighboring states." Id.
The 2007 Ouagadougou Peace Agreement gave IDPs real hope for an end to
80.
their displacement.
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Democratic Republic of the Congo

The DRC, formerly known as Zaire, was established as a Belgian
colony in 1908, gaining its independence in 1960. Its neighbors
include Angola, Burundi, the CAR, Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda,
Almost all of these countries have
Tanzania, and Zambia.8 1
experienced political instability and displacement, but the conditions
in the DRC have been particularly bad: it has seen at least three
military coups and years of civil and regional wars.82
The IDMC estimates the number of IDPs in the DRC to be
approximately 1.4 million; they were displaced largely by internal
and international armed conflict, generalized violence, and human
rights violations.8 3 The UNHCR provides care for 185,809 refugees
and 2,052,677 IDPs in the DRC. 84 The UN Emergency Relief
Coordinator described the situation in the North Kivu Province as of
November 2008: "Congolese civilians found themselves in the worst of
all worlds: subject to attacks, displacement, sexual violence and
forced recruitment perpetrated by advancing rebel forces; and to acts
of violence, rape and looting carried out by members of the official
Congolese armed forces and Mai Mai and other militias."85
All of the armed groups fighting in the region, including DRC
government soldiers, are reported to have frequently attacked
civilians to seize food and belongings or punish people for perceived or

However the lack of comprehensive figures on subsequent return
movements ... does not allow for a clear indication of the number still
displaced. In 2006, the national statistical institute ENSEA estimated that
there were some 709,000 IDPs in southern regions. Up to the end of 2008,
around 70,000 registered IDPs returned to western C6te d'Ivoire and 18,000
civil servants were redeployed in the north, and so at the end of 2008 an
estimated 621,000 IDPs remained. However, this figure does not include those
newly displaced [persons] who did not return within the year [or] people
displaced within the north.
IDMC, supra note 37, at 40.
81.
CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK: DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
geos/cg.html (last updated Dec. 22, 2010).
82.
See id. (discussing the various power struggles that have occurred).
83.
IDMC, supra note 37, at 41.
2011 UNHCR Country Operations Profile: Democratic Republic of the
84.
Congo, UNHCR-THE U.N. REFUGEE AGENCY, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/
vtxlpage?page=49e45c366 (last visited Jan. 5, 2011) [hereinafter Congo Profile].
Mr. John Holmes, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs,
85.
Statement to the United Nations Security Council on Protection of Civilians in Armed
Conflict (Jan. 14, 2009), http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2009.nsflFilesByRW
DocUnidFilename/EDIS-7NBNZR-fullreport.pdfl$File/full-report.pdf.
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real allegiance to other groups. 86 Armed non-state actors have
abducted children to fight.8 7 Children (especially children separated
from their families), female-headed households, and pregnant women
are particularly vulnerable.8 8
e.

Ethiopia

Ethiopia is unique among African countries because of its lack of
colonial history, with the exception of a brief Italian occupation from
1936 to 1941.89 In 1974, a military junta deposed the centuries-old
monarchy and set up a military dictatorship, causing severe social
Although that regime was
unrest and economic problems.90
overthrown in 1991,91 resulting in the repatriation of Ethiopian
refugees from other countries, a border war with neighboring
Eritrea 92 caused significant displacement in the late 1990s.93
The IDMC estimates the number of IDPs to be 200,000-300,000,
caused mostly by internal and external armed conflict, generalized
violence, and human rights violations. 94 According to the UNHCR,
Ethiopia is currently home to 110,000 refugees, most of them from
Somalia.9 5 In the eastern part of Ethiopia, where refugees and IDPs

See generally UN Org. Mission in the Dem. Rep. Congo & Office of the High
86.
Comm'r for Human Rights, Consolidated Investigation Report of the United Nations
Joint Human Rights Office Following Widespread Looting and Grave Violations of
Human Rights by the Congolese National Armed Forces in Goma and Kanyabayonga
in October and November 2008 (Sept. 7, 2009), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
(discussing
various
Countries/GomaKanyabayongaRapportSeptembre_2009.pdf
incidences of human rights violations, including attacks, by national armed forces in
Goma and Kanyabayonga).
87.
COALITION TO STOP THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS, THE USE OF CHILDREN AS
SOLDIERS IN AFRICA: A COUNTRY ANALYSIS OF CHILD RECRUITMENT AND PARTICIPATION
IN ARMED CONFLICT (2000), available at http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/
chilsold.htm.
See Congo Profile, supra note 84.
88.
89.
CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK: ETHIOPIA,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/et.html (last updated
Dec. 8, 2010).
90.
Id.
91.
Id.

92.

James C. McKinley, Jr., Eritrea-EthiopiaWar: Unwanted but Unchecked,

N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1998, at A3.
See CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 89 (noting that there are
93.
200,000 IDPs as a result of events including "the border war with Eritrea from 19982000').

94.

IDMC, supra note 37, at 42; 2010 UNHCR Country Operations Profile:

Ethiopia, UNHCR-THE U.N. REFUGEE AGENCY, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-binitexis/
vtx/page?page=49e483986 (last visited Jan. 5, 2011) [hereinafter EthiopiaProfile].
See Ethiopia Profile, supra note 94 (noting that "[tihe recent escalation of
95.
the crisis in Somalia drove a significant number of refugees into Ethiopia" and
discussing the increasing numbers of refugees from Somalia and elsewhere).
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live side by side, it is often difficult to distinguish between refugees
and IDPs because the ethnic and linguistic backgrounds of the local
Somali population and the refugees from mainland Somalia are
identical. 96
f.

Kenya

Kenya has a population of about 40 million people and shares
boundaries with Ethiopia, Tanzania, Somalia, Uganda, and Sudan.9 7
The country gained its independence from British rule in 1963 and
has a problematic political and security history.9 8 The IDMC
estimates the number of Kenyan IDPs to be 300,000-600,000, caused
by generalized violence and human rights violations.9 9 Most recently,
an estimated 500,000 Kenyans were displaced in the wake of the
country's disputed December 2007 elections. 0 0
Kenya hosts 358,928 refugees, mainly from Somalia, Ethiopia,
and Southern Sudan.1 0 ' The ethnic Somali refugees in Kenya come
from Somalia. 02 They have the same ethnic, linguistic, and religious
backgrounds as some Kenyan IDPs.10 3
g.

Somalia

Somalia has been rightly classified as a failed state since 1991,
and it remains one of the most unstable countries in the world.104

96.
Cf. Assessment for Somalis in Ethiopia, MINORITIES AT RISK PROJECT (Dec.
31,
2003),
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,MARP,,ETH,,469f3a7ale,O.html
(noting that the Somalis "are linguistically and culturally distinct from the dominant
Tigreans (and Amharans from pre-1991)").
KENYA,
97.
CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK:
https://www.cia.govllibrary/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ke.html (last updated
Dec. 7, 2010).
98.
See id. (discussing Kenya's political and ethnic struggles).
99.
IDMC, supra note 37, at 43.
100.
Id.
101.
Id.; 2011 UNHCR Country Operations Profile: Kenya, UNHCR-THE U.N.
REFUGEE AGENCY, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e483al6 (last
visited Jan. 5, 2011) [hereinafter Kenya Profile].
102.
See Kenya Profile, supra note 101 ("The majority of the 404,000 refugees
and asylum-seekers in Kenya are from Somalia, with the rest mostly from Ethiopia
and Sudan.").
103.
See Assessment for Somalis in Kenya, MINORITIES AT RISK PROJECT (Dec.
31, 2006), http://www.cidcm.umd.edulmarlassessment.asp?groupld=50106 (describing
the ethnic groups found in Kenya's population).
104.
Jeffrey Gettleman, The Most Dangerous Place in the World, FOREIGN
POLICY, Feb. 16, 2009, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/02/16/
themost.dangerousplace-in theworld?pagefull.
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Somalia is located in eastern Africa and is bordered by Ethiopia,
Djibouti, and Kenya.105

Internal and external displacement is a daily occurrence in
Somalia. Groups of Somalis could be refugees in Kenya today, back
in Somalia as IDPs next week, and refugees again in eastern Ethiopia
shortly thereafter. The pattern of movement depends on the security
and military situations on the ground, which tend to change rapidly.
Currently, there are an estimated 1.55 million IDPs in Somalia,106
and there are thousands of Somali refugees in neighboring
countries.107

h.

Sudan

Sudan gained its independence from the British in 1956.108 It
has been embroiled in two serious and prolonged civil wars for much
of its post-independence existence. The North-South civil war and
related famine displaced more than four million people and caused
the death of more than two million people.109 The Darfur conflict,
which broke out in 2003, caused untold misery and displaced millions
of people. 110
The IDMC estimates the number of IDPs in Sudan to be 4.9
million, 1 ' including 2.7 million in Darfur, 1.2 million in Khartoum
and the northern states, 420,000 in the eastern states, 356,000 in
transitional areas, and 187,000 in Southern Sudan.112 Sudan also
hosts 181,605 refugees.113 The UNHCR cares for them alongside at

Id.; Background Note: Somalia, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (May 14, 2010),
105.
http://www.state.gov/r/paleilbgn/2863.htm.
2011 UNHCR Country Operations Profile: Somalia, UNHCR-THE U.N.
106.
(last
REFUGEE AGENCY, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-binlexialvtx/page?page=49e483ad6
visited Jan. 5, 2011) [hereinafter Somalia Profile]. IDMC data puts the number of
Somali IDPs at 1.3 million. IDMC, supra note 37, at 45. The variation is
understandable given rapidly changing migratory patterns.
Somalia Profile,supra note 106.
107.
SUDAN,
108.
CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK:
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/su.html (last updated
Dec. 27, 2010).
See IDMC, supra note 37, at 46 (noting that "[b]y the end of 2008, 4.9
109.
million people in Sudan were displaced by the numerous conflicts which had afflicted
the country for over two decades").
See id. at 46-47 (describing the Darfur conflict).
110.
111.
Id. at 46. This figure makes up the single largest internally displaced
population in the world and represents 12.4 percent of Sudan's total population. Id.
Id.
112.
113.
HOME OFFICE, UK BORDER AGENCY, COUNTRY OF ORIGIN BORDER
INFORMATION REPORT: SUDAN $j 32.01 (2010), available at rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/
rds/pdfs10/sudan-260510.doc.
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least 1,034,140 IDPs.114 Some of the refugees in Sudan are from
Chad, which, in turn, cares for at least 262,900 Sudanese refugees." 5
As of the time of writing, UN peacekeeping troops are struggling to
16
stabilize the situation.1
2.

Environmental and Natural Disasters

According to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies, about two billion people were affected by natural
disasters in the last decade, which is a three-fold rise from the
previous decade and roughly five times the number of people affected
by conflicts.' 17 The negative effects of climate change are expected to
cause the movement of 50 to 200 million people in the next several
decades, which will be one of the most serious challenges of this
century." 8 Although some of the migration is likely to be voluntary,
most will be coerced by conditions linked to environmental
These environmental causes are
degradation and disaster.119
expected to be exceptionally severe in Africa.120 In fact, it is not
uncommon for environmental causes to be coupled with conflict and
other causes of migration, further complicating the problem.'12

2011 UNHCR Country Operations Profile: Sudan, UNHCR-THE U.N.
114.
REFUGEE AGENCY, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e483b76 (last
visited Jan. 5, 2011).
Chad Profile, supra note 70.
115.
See Military Chiefs of UN Peacekeeping Forces in Africa Call for More
116.
Troops, Equipment, UN NEWS CENTRE, Aug. 6, 2009, http://www.un.org/apps/
news/story.asp?NewslD=31703 (discussing peacekeeping efforts in Sudan).
117.
See UNHCR, THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES 2006: HuMAN
DISPLACEMENT IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 27 (2006), http://www.unher.org/
4a4dcla89.html (citing IFRC data). For the latest IFRC data, see IFRC, 2008 ANNUAL
REPORT 4-9 (2009), http://www.ifrc.org/Docs/pubs/who/ar2008-en.pdf.
118.
Walter Klin, Representative of the UN Secretary-General on the Human
Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, Speech to Committee on Migration, Refugees
and Population of the Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe: Climate Change,
Natural Disaster, and Internal Displacement (June 24, 2009), available at
http://www.brookings.edulspeeches/2009/0624_internal-displacemenLkalin.aspx
(citing Eur. Parl. Ass., Environmentally Induced Migration and Displacement:A 21stCentury Challenge, 9th Sess., Res. No. 1655 (2009)).
119.
Id.
See generallyIFRC, WORLD DISASTERS REPORT 2009 (2009), http://www.ifrc.org/
120.
Docs/pubs/disasters/wdr2009/WDR2009-full.pdf (providing a comprehensive review of the
worldwide trends).
For example, when the 2004 tsunami hit the Indonesian province of Aceh,
121.
there were about 300,000 IDPs who had left their homes because of conflict. The
tsunami displaced about a half a million more. See UNHCR, supra note 7, at 28
("[R]elief efforts were complicated by the fluid and complex displacement that resulted
from the combination of political causes and the immediate devastation of the
tsunami.").
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Those who move across international boundaries as a result of
natural disaster or climate change are not likely to be recognized as
refugees, as they do not meet the individualized refugee definition of
the UN Refugee Convention. 122 However, the AU Convention's
definition is arguably broad enough to accommodate such people as
refugees.12 3 Irrespective of the issues relating to legal status,
environmental factors will undoubtedly continue to cause the
displacement of millions of people. 124
3.

Trafficking and Smuggling

The U.S. Department of State report on human trafficking notes
that "the common denominator of trafficking scenarios is the use of
force, fraud, or coercion, to exploit a person for profit."1 25 Labor and
sexual exploitation are the most common forms of abuse, and the
State Department calls the phenomenon "modern day slavery."126
The report explains that trafficking for labor exploitation takes the
form of "the traditional chattel slavery, forced labor and debt
bondage," whereas trafficking for sexual exploitation often involves
abuse within the commercial sex industry.12 7 According to the
International Labor Organization, there are currently around 12.3
million trafficked adults and children in the world, affecting almost
every country. 128
Some trafficked persons are taken across
international boundaries. 12 9
The UNHCR acknowledges that trafficking and smuggling are
not always involuntary.130 It notes that, although the exploitative
and coercive nature of trafficking is obvious, some asylum seekers
and other economic migrants use traffickers and smugglers to gain
entry into developed countries.131

Intercontinental trafficking from Africa affects women more than
men because women are often recruited to work as domestic servants

122.
Cf. UN Refugees Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(A) (defining the term
refugee and referring specifically to "fear of persecution").
123.
See African Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(2) (including
displacement as a result of "events seriously disturbing public order").
124.
As of yet, there is no one agency exclusively tracking environmentallyinduced displacements. Unfortunately, IDMC's data are limited to conflict-induced
displacement. See generally IDMC, supra note 37.
125.
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 7 (2009),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/123357.pdf.
126.
Id.
127.
Id.
128.
Id. at 8 (citing the International Labor Organization (ILO)).
129.
Id.
130.
See UNHCR, supra note 7, at 25 (discussing groups that are vulnerable to
trafficking and noting that "smuggling is not a form of forced migration per se").
131.
Id.
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and caretakers in the Middle East, Europe, and North America.' 32 In
contrast, trafficking within the continent of Africa affects young boys
more than any other demographic because they are targeted for child
soldiering.133
4.

Development

Studies suggest that more people are displaced as a result of
Examples of
development projects than armed conflict.134
displacement-inducing projects include dams; urban infrastructure
projects such as electrification, roads, highways, and canals; and
projects linked to the extractive industry. 3 5 A World Bank study
identified eight distinct predicaments facing populations displaced as
a result of development: homelessness, landlessness, joblessness,
marginalization, food insecurity, increased morbidity and mortality,
loss of access to common property, and social disintegration. 13 6 The
same study highlights that indigenous people and marginalized
ethnic minorities are disproportionately impacted by development.' 3 7
For example, in India the Adivasi (tribal people) make up 40-50
percent of the total number of displaced persons, even though they
constitute only 8 percent of the total population. 3 8 The UNHCR
expresses a similar concern: "Poor, indigenous and marginalized
groups are frequently displaced without consultation to make way for
grand national projects. Not only are the rights of such people
ignored, they are rarely offered resettlement or adequate
The World Bank calls the phenomenon of
compensation." 3 9
development-induced displacement "involuntary resettlement" and
attempts to mitigate the grave consequences of projects it finances.140

132.

133.
soldiers).
134.

U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 125, at 18.

See id. at 19-21 (describing the practice of abducting children to be used as
IDMC, TRAINING ON THE PROTECTION OF IDPs: DEVELOPMENT-INDUCED

DISPLACEMENT 1, http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708FO04BE3B1/(httplnfo
Files)/C753862FA2CF8B7CC1257115004752ED/$file/Protection from module handout
development displacement.pdf.
Id.
135.
136.
Id. (citing Michael M. Cernea, Why Economic Analysis Is Essential to
OF INVOLUNTARY
in
THE ECONOMICS
Resettlement: A
Sociologist's View,
RESETTLEMENT: QUESTIONS AND CHALLENGES 5, 17-18 (Michael Cernea ed., 1999)).
137.
Id. at 2.
138.
Id.

139.
UNHCR, supra note 7, at 154.
140.
For comprehensive information on the Bank's efforts, see Involuntary
Resettlement, WORLD BANK, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/
EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/EXTINVRES/0,,menuPK:410241-pagePK: 149018-piPK
:149093-theSitePK:410235,00.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2011) (discussing involuntary
resettlement and the World Bank Involuntary Resettlement team, the purpose of
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B. The OperationalCategoriesof Forced Migrants
The need-based operational categories are simpler than the
citizenship-based juridical categories. Although the legal categories
do not necessarily correspond to the need-based categories, it is
important to understand the need-based categories to assess the
validity of the legal regimes that purport to provide protection to the
various classes of displaced persons. The operational categories may
be understood in a continuum ranging from non-displaced vulnerable
populations to populations that are in the process of reintegration
after returning from displacement. This section briefly discusses
eight different categories in this continuum.
1.

Non-Displaced Vulnerable Populations

Varying levels of vulnerabilities affect various categories of
persons who live in conflict-prone areas. The displaced are not
necessarily the most vulnerable. According to the UNHCR, in areas
where long-term conflicts exist, such as in Uganda and Burundi, "the
dominant trend is one of short-term, short distance, repetitive
dislocation rather than large-scale displacement into camps. It is
often extremely difficult to distinguish between displaced and nondisplaced populations."141 For example, in Colombia, rebel groups
often forcibly prevent displacement to benefit from supplies shipped
to the civilians.1 42 These forces also use the civilian population as a
source of recruits and cover.143 These populations are likely to flee
every time they get the opportunity, but, until then, they remain
vulnerable.
Another example of vulnerable non-displaced persons is the
segment of the community that is too weak to flee because of old age,
ailment, or disability. The UNHCR estimates that right after the
Afghanistan war began, there were more non-displaced vulnerable
Afghans than Afghan IDPs and refugees combined.144 The protection
and assistance needs of this category of persons are the same as, if
not greater than, IDPs, refugees, or some other categories.

which is to "identify, plan, implement, and monitor involuntary resettlement to
minimize displacement and restore incomes").
UNHCR, supra note 7, at 14.
141.
Id.
142.
Id.
143.
144.
Id.
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IDPs

The operational meaning of the IDP category is more or less the
same as the legal definition under the AU Convention. The IDP
category includes persons who were forced to flee their homes but
remain sheltered within the boundaries of their country of citizenship
or habitual residence. 145 They often flee their homes for the same
reasons as refugees and forced migrants. 14 6 They may be trapped
between fighting forces and are often subject to attacks by either
their own governments or rebel forces. 147 Numerically, there are
more than two times as many IDPs as compared to refugees.14 8 The
UNHCR attests that IDPs are "frequently in a more desperate
situation than refugees." 4 9
3.

Refugees

Operationally, there are two categories of refugees: refugees who
meet the requirements of the individualistic definition of the 1951
Refugee Convention1 50 and refugees who the UNHCR considers
prima facie refugees in circumstances of mass exodus. 5 1 In both
instances, refugees must cross an international boundary.152
UNHCR statistics suggest that there are 15.2 million refugees
worldwide, excluding asylums seekers, a distinct category discussed
in the next subsection.' 5 3 About four-fifths (8.8 million) of all

AU Convention, supra note 9, art. 1(k); Guiding Principles, supra note 8.
145.
UNHCR, supra note 7, at 153.
146.
See id. at 153-56 (observing that IDPs are exposed to different threats than
147.
refugees, threats that are often more grave and frequently result in higher mortality
rates).
148.
Id. at 153.
149.
Id.
The UN Refugees Convention classifies one as a refugee who has a
150.
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of
such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
UN Refugees Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(A)(2).
Cf. African Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(2) (defining a refugee
151.
in broader terms, including those displaced as a result of armed conflict); History of
UNHCR, supra note 3 (indicating that the outpouring of Hungarian refugees in 1956
demonstrated the necessity of the UNHCR).
UN Refugees Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(A)(2); African Refugee
152.
Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(2).
UNHCR, supra note 18, at 2.
153.
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refugees are in developing countries. 5 4 While about half of all
refugees live in urban centers worldwide, about seven in ten live in
camps in sub-Saharan Africa.15 5 Between 75 and 91 percent of
refugees remain within their region of origin.156 For example,
according to the UNHCR data, a refugee from Somalia has an 85
percent chance of being sheltered in Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti,
Eritrea, or Sudan.
4.

Asylum Seekers

People who lodge individual applications to be recognized as
"convention refugees" are considered asylum seekers.15 7 According to
the UNHCR, in 2008, about 839,000 individual asylum applications
were filed with states or UNHCR offices around the world. 58 This is
a fraction of the general refugee population under UNHCR care. 159
The demographic data is worth emphasizing. According to the
UNHCR, the vast majority of children seek refuge in poor
countries.160 Children under the age of eighteen constitute 54
percent of refugees in Africa, 46 percent in Asia, and 25 percent in
Europe.161 The UNHCR concludes that "[t]he low number of refugee
children reaching industrialized countries may be partly the result of
age-selective asylum migration, including the 'secondary' movements
of asylum seekers from poor refugee-hosting regions to richer
countries."16 2 Although not as significant as the age disparity, the
gender disparity is also notable: women constitute 50 percent of
African refugees but only 41 percent of North American refugees.163
This statistic suggests that those who are likely to be asylum seekers
in developed countries are more likely to be adult males who have
better means to move from place to place.164

154.
Id.
155.
Id.
156.
Id. at 7.
157.
"Convention refugee" is a term the UNHCR uses to refer to refugees who
meet the individualistic refugee definition of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Id. at 5 n.9,
14 (noting that individuals are refugees as soon as these criteria are met, regardless of
whether asylum has been granted).
158.
Id. at 14.
159.
See id. at 2 (noting that worldwide there are 827,000 asylum seekers
compared to 15.2 million refugees).
160.
UNHCR, supranote 7, at 20.
161.
Id. at 20-22.
162.
Id. at 22.
163.
Id.
164.
See Jacqueline Bhabha, Demography and Rights: Women, Children and
Access to Asylum, 16 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 227, 235 (2004) (positing that women in
developed countries are less likely to migrate due to a combination of formal and
informal structures urging against a self perception as an autonomous migrant).
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Jacqueline Bhabha, Director of Harvard's Committee on Human
Rights Studies, suggests that:
It is likely that both institutional and individual factors are at play in
different ways for each population. In the case of women, reduced
access to the formal and informal structures that facilitate migration
(state agencies, travel agencies, smugglers, family funding), together
with dependent family status, resource inadequacy, personal history
and social positioning, which militate against a self-perception as an
autonomous asylum seeker, are likely to be powerful impediments to
65
individual flight.1

Although there is no specific data on the demographics of the
UNHCR's adjudication of individual asylum claims, it is reasonable to
assume that those with better means are likely to live in cities, as
opposed to refugee camps, and to lodge individual asylum claims. In
light of this premise, it is fair to conclude that asylum seekers tend to
come from the privileged segment of the general refugee population.
At a minimum, they get the opportunity to be heard on an individual
or family basis. This is not to understate the challenges that asylum
seekers face. Although they seem to have better opportunities to be
heard, they do not have any guarantees that they will succeed. In
fact, the trend in developed countries reflects the difficulty that
asylum seekers face in accessing the system and prevailing. Since
2001, the number of asylum applicants has declined by 30 percent in
Germany, 33 percent in the United Kingdom, 26 percent in North
America, and 28 percent in Australia and New Zealand.166
5.

Stateless Persons

Stateless persons are persons who are not considered to be
citizens of any country.' 6 7 There are an estimated 9 to 11 million
stateless persons today.' 6 8 Stateless persons are almost always
disenfranchised and have limited or no civil, political, or economic
rights, even within their countries of habitual residence. They are
affected by displacement like any other population, but their status
as IDPs, asylum seekers, or refugees is obviously more complicated
because of their lack of citizenship.' 6 9
Refugee status could also create statelessness if the host country
does not consider the children born in its territories to be its citizens

Id.
165.
166.
UNHCR, supra note 7, at 15.
167.
See Convention for the Reduction of Statelessness, art. 1, Aug. 30, 1961,
989 U.N.T.S. 175 (making provisions to reduce the possibility of statelessness through
the granting of citizenship).
168.
UNHCR, supra note 7, at 26.
169.
See id. at 26-27 (observing deprivations of rights resulting from lack of
citizenship and examining rectification efforts in Sri Lanka, Ukraine, and Macedonia).
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and the state of the parents' nationality does not consider those born
outside that state to be its citizens. This situation raises some
serious problems when the parents are repatriated to their home
state. 170
Although the 1961 Convention for the Reduction of
Statelessness makes provisions to minimize these kinds of
circumstances by obligating states to make laws that avoid the denial
of citizenship to those who would otherwise become stateless, it has
only been ratified by fifty-seven states.171
According to the UNHCR, examples of protracted situations of
statelessness include the Biharis in Bangladesh; the Bidoons in
Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia; some
Kurds in Syria; and the Muslim population of Myanmar.172
Significant numbers of stateless persons also live in Brunei,
Cambodia, Malaysia, and Vietnam.1 73
The UNHCR notes that statelessness is not well understood in
many countries and, as such, gathering accurate statistical data is
very difficult.17 4 Stateless persons usually live in "a precarious
situation on the margins of society and are subject to
discrimination." 175 With only fifty-four states reporting data on
stateless populations, the UNHCR acknowledges that it does not fully
understand the scope of the problem. 176 The data in the UNHCR's
Statistical Yearbook is telling. In Africa, for example, only two
countries reported their stateless populations.17 7 Egypt reported
sixty-four stateless individuals, and Kenya reported 100,000.178 The
great majority of displaced persons in Africa do not submit individual
applications for refugee status or other forms of subsidiary protection
and assistance because they receive UNHCR protection and
assistance on prima facie bases. 179 Therefore, the relevance of

170.
Id.; see also Convention for the Reduction of Statelessness, supra note 167,
art. 1 (discussing when contracting states will grant nationality).
171.
UNHCR, supranote 7, at 26.
172.
Id. at 27.
173.
Id.
174.
UNHCR STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 2007, at 31 (2008), http://www.unher.org/
4981c3252.html.
175.
Id.
176.
See id. at 31-32 (explaining the discrepancy between country-specific
displaced persons figures and worldwide estimates as the result of official reporting by
too few countries).
177.
See UNHCR STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 2008, ANNEX: COUNTRY DATA SHEETS
65-68 (2009), http://www.unhcr.org/4bcc5c9f9.pdf (providing population data from
various countries for groups of individuals including refugees and stateless persons as
of end-2008).
178.
Id.
179.
See History of UNHCR, supra note 3 (noting that UNHCR has expanded its
coverage of the stateless to support those denied basic rights for want of citizenship).
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citizenship status to most displaced populations in Africa seems
minimal at best.
6.

Secondary Migrants

Secondary migrants are migrants who move to a secondary
location from any place of primary displacement. 18 0 They move for a
variety of reasons, including seeking better protection in developed
countries. In that sense, this category is analogous to the asylum
seeker category and the demographics probably share the
characteristics discussed in the previous section. They could also be
trafficked or smuggled.18 1
Another example of secondary movement is resettlement.
Resettlement is an opportunity offered to those who meet the
individualistic definition of the Refugee Convention. The United
States, Canada, and Australia take about 90 percent of all secondary
migrants through their resettlement programs. 182 Apart from the
refugee definition, a state's decision to resettle particular groups of
refugees is based on a combination of geopolitical, foreign policy, and
The most vulnerable are not
humanitarian considerations.18 3
necessarily the ones who benefit, as shown by the following true story
of a Somali refugee:
Sahra Dirie is a refugee from Somalia. She fled her country with her
husband and their children when civil war broke out in 1991. They
sought refuge in neighboring Kenya, where they were placed in the
Garisa refugee camp. There they lived in a tent and relied on handouts
from international humanitarian organizations to survive. The camp
was dirty, disease ridden and violent. The Kenyan police who patrolled
the camp beat and raped its inhabitants with impunity.
This horrifying fact became all too real for Sahra when a Kenyan
police officer raped her in 2002. In Somalia, being the victim of rape
brings shame upon a woman and renders her a disgrace to her family.
Sahra did not tell anyone except her sister in the United States what
happened to her. She believes her husband suspected it, however,
because he abandoned her and the family shortly after the rape. At the

180.
See UNHCR, supra note 7, at 24 (noting secondary migration as leading to
a more complex mixture of migratory motives).
Id. at 24.
181.
182.
Id. at 190 n.18. The remaining 10 percent are primarily divided among
Norway, Sweden, New Zealand, Finland, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Ireland. Id.
See Heidi H. Boas, The New Face of America's Refugees: African Refugee
183.
Resettlement to the United States, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 431, 441-47 (2007) (noting four
important considerations for the increase in the number of refugees resettled in the
United States: (1) the end of the Cold War, (2) the influence of nongovernmental
organizations, (3) the leadership of the congressional black caucus, and (4)
humanitarian consideration as exemplified by the resettlement of the Somali Bantus
and the lost boys of Sudan).
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time he left, Sahra was pregnant, and she believes it was the result of
the rape.
Sahra was left with her six other children and only her elderly
mother to help her care and provide for them. A few months later,
Sahra's mother received word that she had been approved for
resettlement in the United States. After Sahra gave birth, she went to
the resettlement interview with her mother, believing that she would
be accompanying her mother to the United States. The representative
informed them that Sahra, because she was over twenty-one years of
age, did not qualify to join her mother. Moreover, Sahra had never
registered as a refugee with the camp authorities and thus had not
been identified as an applicant for resettlement in her own right.
Sahra's mother received final approval on her application for refugee
resettlement. She was ill and had little choice but to leave Kenya for
the United States. Sahra was left alone with her children in the
refugee camp.
After her mother's departure, Sahra lost hope in the refugee system.
She took her children to live in a shantytown on the outskirts of the
camp in an effort to escape violence and despair. Humanitarian groups
worked to secure a new resettlement interview for Sahra based on a
different category of resettlement reserved for at-risk women and
children. By the time the humanitarian groups managed to secure a
new interview in early 2004, however, camp officials could not locate
Sahra and her children. Their fate is unknown.
The conditions in Sahra's refugee camp are similar to those found in
refugee camps all over the world and are partly to blame for her ordeal.
Violence, poverty and disease are common in refugee camps and affect
the entire refugee population.
Women and children, particularly
unaccompanied children and women who are single heads of
households, are even more susceptible to camp conditions and to a
broader range of violent acts and persecution because of their age or
sex. Due to cultural traditions and camp logistics, women are also less
likely to have a voice in camp management or, in the case of children as
well as women, even to be registered as refugees. This lack of visibility
increases the risk that women and children refugees, even more so than
the rest of the refugee population, will suffer severe abuse and be
deprived of refugee benefits.
The nature of the U.S. Refugee Resettlement Program also played a
significant role in the outcome of Sahra's case. U.S. national security
concerns and shifting policy priorities combine with corrupt practices
on the part of resettlement applicants and aid workers to create a
labyrinthine resettlement process that often seems illogical and
inefficient. As a result, individuals like Sahra, who have not committed
fraud, do not present national security risks, and are a high priority for
humanitarian assistance, nevertheless slip through the gaping cracks
184
that undermine the system.

184.
Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo, The W Visa: A Legislative Proposalfor Female
and Child Refugees Trapped in the Post-September 11 World, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
459, 460-63 (2005). Cianciarulo proposes a nonimmigrant visa for this category of most
vulnerable refugees who are not likely to benefit from the regular procedures. Id. at
499-500.
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Voluntary Returnees

Voluntary repatriation is often considered a durable solution to
displacement.18 5 Many displaced persons return to their homes when
the circumstances that compelled their flight no longer exist. 186
According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs, however,
[i]t is very difficult to get accurate figures for IDPs because populations
are constantly fluctuating or inaccessible: some IDPs may be returning
home while others are fleeing, others may periodically return to IDP
camps to take advantage of humanitarian aid; some return home
temporarily but come back to their place of displacement, or move
187
elsewhere.

The same pattern exists in cross-continental refugee mobility. A
number of asylum countries encourage refugees to return.188
Frequently, refugees return prematurely and flee to the same or
other places again. For example, according to a recent UNHCR
study, Denmark repatriated 306 Iraqi refugees to Iraq with an option
to return to Denmark within twelve months.'8 9 Of the 306 refugees,
The study
73 exercised their option to return to Denmark.o9 0
identifies a complicated set of common political, security, and
economic hardships faced by repatriated refugees.' 9 ' For example, as
a result of their prolonged absence, some returnees assume an
outsider status in their original homes, often to the point that
reintegration becomes very difficult or even impossible.1 92 In Africa,
the consequences can be even more dramatic. Returnees often find

Returnees, UNHCR-The UN REFUGEE AGENCY, http://www.unhcr.org/
185.
pages/49c3646clca.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2011).
See id. ("For many people forced from their homes, a voluntary return home
186.
in safety and dignity marks the successful end to the trauma.").
Main Challenges, Access, Identification, and Protection, OFFICE FOR THE
187.
COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFF. [OCHA], http://ochaonline.un.org/News/
InFocus/InternallyDisplacedPeoplelDPs/MainChallenges/tabid/5140/language/en-US/
Default.aspx (last visited Jan. 5, 2011).
188.
See INT'L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, RETURN MIGRATION: POLICIES & PRACTICES
IN EUROPE, 7 (2004), http://www.ch.iom.int/fileadmin/medialpdf/publikationen/
return -migration.pdf (noting the assisted voluntary return programs of several
European countries). For a discussion of Denmark's general policy of encouraging
return, repatriation, and reintegration to achieve a durable solution, see Maria Helene
et al., CircularRepatriation:The Unsuccessful Return and Reintegration of Iraqis with
Refugees Status in Denmark 1 (UNHCR, Policy Dev. & Evaluation Serv., Research
Paper No. 165, 2008), http://www.unhcr.org/48eb34c72.html.
Helene et al., supra note 188, at 1.
189.
190.
Id.
See id. at 20 (providing ten factors representative of particular theoretical
191.
motivations underpinning failed repatriation).
Id. at 6-7.
192.
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their homes burned, their personal property destroyed, and their
farmland infested with landmines.1 93
8.

Mixed Migrants

The UNHCR neatly summarizes the phenomenon of mixed
migration in the following terms:
Modern migratory patterns make it increasingly difficult to
distinguish between the various groups on the move. Population flows
are not homogenous but of a mixed, composite character.
The
immediate causes of forced displacement may be identified as serious
human rights violations or armed conflict. But these causes often
overlap with, or may themselves be provoked or aggravated by,
economic marginalization and poverty, environmental degradation,
population pressure and poor governance.
Asylum seekers and refugees may use the same modes of travel as
undocumented migrants and resort to, or be exploited by, smugglers
and traffickers. In some cases, refugees may use these channels to
leave one country of asylum and move to another to escape insecurity or
economic hardship. On the other hand, persons who do not qualify for
international protection may resort to claiming asylum in the hope of
1 94
being allowed to stay abroad.

The overlap in the motives for the movement of persons creates
challenges in the classification of the various categories of
migrants. 195
Attempting to regulate the extraordinarily complex phenomenon
of migration-and forced migration in particular-is a daunting task
indeed. The community of nations attempted to regulate a small
portion of the phenomenon by law when the UN adopted the Refugee
Convention. The following Parts assess the validity of the African
Union's attempt to extend a similar legal regime to the IDPs category
and its interaction with the existing regime of refugee law.
III. THE RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH TO MANAGING
DISPLACEMENT: THE DOCTRINAL DILEMMA

Internally displaced, externally displaced, or not displaced, "all
human beings are" supposed to be "born free and equal in dignity and
rights." 196 Humans "are endowed with reason and conscience and
193.
See, e.g., Press Release, UNHCR, Eritrea: Border Area Devastated (Oct. 3,
2000), available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=
(discussing the decimation of many
3ae6b8264&query-returnees%201andmines
Eritrean villages at the hands of Ethiopian troops).
UNHCR, supra note 7, at 24.
194.
195.
Id.
UDHR, supra note 13, art. 1.
196.
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should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood." 9 7
Moreover, "everyone" is supposed to be entitled to all the rights and
freedoms set forth under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR).1 98 These rights include due process and equal protection of
the law' 9 9 without regard to "race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status." 200
Although most provisions of the UDHR, including the
nondiscrimination provisions, are arguably binding on all states as
expressions of customary international law,2 01 other binding
international human rights treaties leave room for the discriminatory
treatment of non-nationals. 202 Although as persons, refugees are
entitled to the full range of human rights applicable to all persons
under international human rights law, as "aliens," their rights may
be curtailed. They may not even be allowed to enter the country of
refuge. 20 3 Even if they successfully enter, the authorities of the state
where they seek refuge must first recognize them as meeting the
requirements under their laws. 204 Even then, the displaced person's
rights are limited to those guaranteed by international refugee law
and enshrined in the domestic laws of the receiving country. 205
Professor Hathaway writes:
[T]he inadequacy of international human rights law as a response to
the vulnerabilities of refugees is in part a function of its inattention to
the concerns of aliens generally. Inapplicable assumptions and outright
exclusions reflect the orientation of international human rights law to

197.
Id. art. 1.
198.
Id. art. 2.
199.
Id. arts. 7, 10.
200.
Id. art. 2.
201.
Buergenthal, supra note 13, at 9.
See, e.g., ICESCR, supra note 13, art. 2(3) (allowing developing countries to
202.
treat non-nationals differently). Compare ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 25 ("Every
citizen"), with ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 26 (granting political participation rights to
every citizen as distinct from ensuring that "all persons" have equal protection under
the law).
See, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Councils Center, 509 U.S. 155, 182-83 (1993)
203.
(holding that the principle of non-refoulement or non-return under Article 33 of the
Refugee Convention does not prohibit a state from gathering refugees headed towards
its shores and returning them without screening them for refugee status).
204.
See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1157-58
(2006) (setting forth the procedures for the recognition of refugees and asylum seekers
in accordance with the Refugee Convention).
205.
See HATHAWAY, RIGHTS OF REFUGEES, supra note 1, at 110 (noting that
stateless refugees have limited access to the protections afforded by international
human rights conventions because stateless refugees, as non-nationals, lack a state
that will advocate their rights).
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meeting the needs of most of the world's population, who are citizens of
6
their state of residence. 20

The early response of the UN was to deny the existence of a difference
between citizens and non-citizens for the purposes of international
human rights norms because the general nondiscrimination laws
were meant to apply without regard to any particular identifying
However, as Hathaway notes, the binding
characteristics. 207
international human rights treaties do not address the vulnerabilities
of aliens. 208 The UN's effort to catalog the rights of aliens in a
binding instrument has not become a reality. 209 Alienage remains a
handicap to the enjoyment of the full range of human rights.
In that sense, it would appear that citizens are advantaged and
non-citizens are disadvantaged. Refugee law attempts to mitigate
this problem for the benefit of refugees. 210 Ironically, however, under
certain circumstances, the protection that refugee law provides to
non-citizens may be attractive to certain displaced citizens because
they find themselves in refugee-like situations. However, according
these IDPs a legal status analogous to refugee status is problematic
because refugee law is essentially "formulated to serve as a back-up
to the protection one expects from the State of which an individual is
a national."21 x If a person is presumably under the protection of his
or her own state, ordinary human rights laws may be invoked
without the need for a distinct legal status or standing. 212 However,
the reality for millions of IDPs around the world is that the states of
their nationality are unable or unwilling to provide the required
protection. The question is thus whether according these IDPs a
separate international legal status analogous to refugee status is
doctrinally and functionally sound.
This Part weighs the arguments of the most outspoken
protagonists on both sides. Professor James Hathaway's point of view
is a good representative of the arguments for distinct treatment of the

206.

Id. at 147.

207.
208.

Id.
Id. at 148-49.

209. Id. It is important to note, however, that in 1985 the UN adopted the
Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who Are Not Nationals of the Country
in Which They Live, G.A. Res. 40/144, Annex, U.N. Doc. AIRES/40/144 (Dec. 13, 1985).
HATHAWAY, RIGHTS OF REFUGEES, supra note 1, at 149-50.
210.
See id. at 4 (quoting Canada v. Ward, 11993) 2 S.C.R. 689 (Can.)).
211.
See UDHR, supra note 13, art. 2 (stipulating that UDHR guarantees apply
212.
to all persons without distinction on discriminatory bases); Buergenthal, supra note 13,
at 9 (arguing that the UDHR is a part of customary international law, and thus
provides recourse to its provisions where one has legal protections generally).
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IDP and refugee categories. 213 Roberta Cohen, from the Brookings
Institute, maintains a holistic approach. 2 14 The following discussion
describes and evaluates the exchanges between these two strong
voices.
A. Hathaway v. Cohen
Writing metaphorically, Hathaway argues that marrying refugee
law studies to forced migration studies is not in the best interest of
the refugee partner, and he proposes a "dating" arrangement. 2 15
There are two important reasons for his opposition to the marriage.
First:
[S]ubsuming refugee studies into the broader framework of forced
migration studies may result in a failure to take account of the
specificity of the refugee's circumstances which are defined not just by
movement to avoid the risk of harm, but by the underlying social
disfranchisement coupled with the unqualified ability of the
216
international community to respond to their needs.

Second, such a marriage may encourage a focus on the phenomenon
of forced displacement rather than "on the personal predicaments,
needs, challenges, and rights of refugees themselves." 2 17 Hathaway
illustrates the first concern by reference to the emerging IDP category
and the second by referring to the notion of a durable solution to the
phenomenon of forced migration in general. 2 18
Hathaway fears that reformulating the refugee category as a
manifestation of the broader problem of forced migration could erode
the rights-based refugee jurisprudence that he has contributed to
significantly. 219 Merging the various categories of migrants under
one umbrella carries the risk of undermining the specific rights that
states owe to refugees. 220 In other words, he does not want refugees

213.
Katy Long, Early Repatriation Policy: Russian Refugee Return 1922-1924,
22 J. REFUGEE STUD. 133, 134 (2009) (referring to Hathaway as sparking debate in the
field of forced migration studies).
See generally Roberta Cohen, Response to Hathaway, 20 J. REFUGEE STUD.
214.
370 (2007) (arguing that analysis of the needs of both IDPs and refugees must
fundamentally seek to secure rights, rather than dispute primacy).
215.
Hathaway, supra note 7, at 349.
216.
Id.
217.
Id.
218.
Id.
219.
See id. at 350 (arguing that refugee rights are threatened by the
incorporation of refugees within the broader forced migration phenomenon because it
results in conceptual blurring and refocuses the debate from individual rights to
systemic management). His main contributions include: HATHAWAY, RIGHTS OF
REFUGEES, supra note 1; JOHN C. HATHAWAY, RECONCEIVING INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE
LAW (1997); HATHAWAY, REFUGEE STATUS, supra note 1.

220.

Hathaway, supranote 7, at 351.
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to be considered "no more than (forced) migrants." 221 Although he
acknowledges that "the labels may be arbitrarily conceived and fail to
reflect true substantive differences," he cannot resist the temptation
of saying that refugees are more deserving or even "doubly deserving"
of protection. 222 He believes that refugees deserve more protection
because they are at substantial risk of harm on account of who they
are or what they believe-characteristics that they cannot change or
must not be required to change. 223 He further argues that the
distinct treatment of refugees makes more sense because the
international community can "guarantee a remedy," as refugees are
by definition outside of the country where they are persecuted. 224 In
other words, being a refugee "means being a person who deserves
protection and being a person who can, in practical terms, be
guaranteed the substitute or surrogate protection of the international
community." 225
Hathaway provides specific examples in which deemphasizing
the unique status of refugees affected outcomes. One of his examples
relates to UNHCR's involvement in the provision of assistance to
would-be refugees inside the former Yugoslavia. 226 Acknowledging
that Western European countries exerted every effort to discourage
the influx of refugees into their territories, he blames the UNHCR for
being "co-opted" to proclaim the IDPs' "right to remain" within their
country. 227 He further argues that the "right to remain" policy might
have contributed to the Srebrenica massacre. 228 For Hathaway,
"[t]here is little doubt that the sudden interest in IDPs was, at least
in a larger measure, a strategy designed to deflect scrutiny of the
refusal of states to live up to their responsibilities to refugees." 229
At a more technical level, Hathaway believes that IDPs are more
like non-displaced persons who face human rights violations in their
own country than refugees who are aliens in the country of refuge. 230
To support this argument, he quotes a statement by the UN Assistant
High Commissioner for Refugees:
221.
Id. at 352.
222.
See id. at 351-52 (stating that, although labels may be arbitrary, refugees
should be afforded additional protection because of their specific characteristics).
223.
See id. at 352.
224.
Id. at 353.
225.
Id. He adds, "Despite the often attenuated nature of sovereign power today,
it remains the case that a clear guarantee of rights can only be made to persons who
are outside of their own country." Id.
226.
See id. at 356 (discussing the UNHCR's role in constraining refugees'
ability to leave the conflict area).
227.
Id.
See id. (noting that enforcement of the "duty to remain" contributed to the
228.
massacre in Srebrenica).
229.
See id. at 357.
230.
Id. at 358.
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The question being asked is whether it is artificial, in a complex
emergency, to make a distinction between persons actually displaced
and the border population of the country, who may be just as
vulnerable. This is illustrated well, perhaps, by the situation in the
eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It is
exceedingly difficult to distinguish between IDPs and the population at
large. Humanitarian assistance is lacking; the population as a whole
faces constant harassment by armed elements; sexual and gender
violence is rife; there is no rule of law; and corruption is everywhere
endemic and rampant. In these circumstances, should international
231
responsibility begin and end with IDPs only?

For Hathaway, the only factual circumstance that makes IDPs
look more like refugees than non-displaced vulnerable populations is
the loss of property. 232 And yet, he says, "it is doubtful that this
single qualitative difference from the predicament of non-displaced
human rights victims (and parallel to the situation of refugees) is a
sufficient basis to carve out a scholarly, legal, or operational niche for
the internally displaced (much less to justify the merged 'forced
migrant' category)." 233
Dismissing the UN Guiding Principles on IDPs as a mere
restatement of existing law2 34 and affirming that "there is a sound
principled basis not to lump refugees in with all forced migrants,
much less with migrants generally,"23 5 Hathaway arrives at a very
provocative conclusion:
The fact that neither new law nor new institutions have evolved
despite the massive investment in reorienting away from refugees and
towards forced migration in general should give us a pause... . My own
view is that the paucity of concrete progress in achieving rights and
remedies to forced migration suggests the non-viability of the forced
migration label. It groups together two sets of persons-refugees and
the internally displaced-who in fact share little other than the shared
236
symptoms of involuntary movement.

First and
Hathaway's arguments do not impress Cohen.
foremost, she accuses him of neglecting the literature pertaining to
the IDPs category, 237 as well as attempting to "turn the clock back to

231.
Id. at 359-60.
See id. at 360 (noting the risk of property loss born by both refugees and
232.
IDPs).
233.
Id. at 362.
234.
See id. at 358-59 (stating that the Guiding Principles add basically nothing
to the existing body of law).
235.
Id. at 353.
236.
Id. at 359.
237.
See Cohen, supra note 214, at 372. In her own words: "His dismissal of the
Guiding Principles for having added 'virtually nothing to the pre-existing corpus of
already binding international human rights law' suggests that he has not read the
Compilation and Analysis of Legal Norms that preceded the drafting of the Guiding
Principles or the Annotations to the Principles." Interestingly, Hathaway cites to
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an earlier time when only refugees, or individuals who flee across
borders from persecution, could expect attention from the
international community." 238 She then attempts to refute each of his
arguments.
For Cohen, the 1951 definition of a refugee is almost obsolete
because today's reality is that most refugees are driven out of their
homes by armed conflict and generalized violence rather than
individualized persecution. 239 Therefore, disparate treatment, on the
basis of political boundaries, of displaced persons who face similar
violations seems senseless to her. 24 0 To highlight the policy confusion
that disparate treatment might cause, she poses a question once
asked by Hilary Benn, the UK's former Secretary of State for
International Development: "Is it really sensible that we have
different systems for dealing with people fleeing their homes
dependent on whether they happen to have crossed an international
border?" 241
She uses the circumstances in West Darfur and Chad to
illustrate her point of view. 242 The UNHCR beneficiaries in West
Darfur include internally displaced Sudanese and refugees from
Chad.243 The composition just across the border is more or less the
same: refugees from Sudan and IDPs from Chad. 244 Cohen argues
that any legal regime that treats these individuals differently is
simply not sensible, 245 and she extends this argument to suggest that
refugees are not necessarily more deserving of protection because
IDPs often face similar persecution and discrimination. 246 In other
words, there is nothing that inherently shields IDPs from facing the
same type of persecution as refugees who managed to flee across an
international boundary.
Cohen rejects Hathaway's comparison of IDPs to mere "internal
human rights" victims or vulnerable populations, and she argues that

Cohen's 2002 speech for this exact same proposition. See Hathaway, supra note 7, at
358-59 (citing Roberta Cohen, Speech to the Brookings Institution: The Guiding
Principles: How do they Support IDP Response Strategies? (Oct. 9, 2001) [hereinafter
Cohen Speech], available at http://www.brookings.edulspeeches/2001/1109human
rights-cohen.aspx.) Cohen's specific words were: "What is unique about the Principles
is that in addition to restating provisions of existing law, they tailor the provisions of
the law to the specific needs of the internally displaced." Cohen Speech, supra.
Cohen, supra note 214, at 370.
238.
Id.
239.
240.
Id.
241.
Id.
See id. (illustrating UN assistance for Chadian refugees in Darfur).
242.
243.
Id.
244.
Id.
Id. at 371.
245.
See id. at 371-72 (arguing that IDPs face the same challenges as refugees
246.
and should receive similar protections).
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IDPs are more like refugees. 24 7 She lists a number of peculiar
vulnerabilities that warrant peculiar attention.24 8 Many IDPs live in
camps just like refugees and face the prospect of internal
refoulement, meaning they risk being returned to places where they
could face harm. 249 IDPs also lose their homes and other property,
including land; become disconnected from their communities and
livelihoods; and face inherent vulnerabilities linked to their living
conditions. 250 Cohen notes that, just like refugees, IDPs face a higher
mortality rate, a higher exposure to sexual violence, increased
malnutrition problems, and less access to education and jobs.2 5 '
These arguments, of course, force Cohen to directly confront
Hathaway's most important argument, the argument that the
international community is unable to provide protection to citizens of
sovereign states inside their own territories but has an "unqualified
ability" to provide assistance to refugees as a matter of international
law.25 2 Cohen almost concedes the "unqualified ability" argument,
but she attempts to refute it by relying on policy analysis rather than
on legal authority:
While it is true that the international community may not have the
same 'unqualified ability' to come to [IDPs] aid as it does in the case of
refugees, counter-insurgency or ethnic cleansing campaigns carried out
by governments or non-state actors often require an international
response. So too do situations in which IDPs are perishing in camps,
253
deprived of the necessities of life and basic security.

She relies on the UN Guiding Principles, which state that the
"international community has an important role to play in addressing
the protection and assistance needs of IDPs."254
As discussed above, Hathaway suspects a sinister motive on the
part of powerful states in readily embracing the merger of the refugee
category into the IDPs category. 2 55 Although Cohen agrees that such
a motive might have played a role in certain states' decisions, she is
not convinced that it is the principal motivation behind the push to
merge the refugee and IDP categories. 256 She argues that the
principal motivation is a legitimate and sincere recognition of the
reality: an increasing number of IDPs and a changing notion of

See id. at 374 (demonstrating similarities between IDPs and refugees).
247.
248.
Id.
Id.
249.
250.
Id.
251.
Id.
252.
Id. at 371.
253.
Id.
254.
Id. (emphasis added). The arguments of Cohen and Hathaway on this issue
are critiqued in the following section.
255.
Id. at 373.
256.
Id.
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sovereignty. 257 Cohen notes that the inhospitality to refugees has
independent causes linked to the end of the Cold War and a lack of
political advantage, as well as security and cost concerns. 258
Finally, Cohen addresses Hathaway's argument that the lack of
new IDP-focused laws and institutions is a function of the doctrinal
nonviability of merging the IDP category with the refugee category. 259
She argues that this assertion is factually inaccurate and analytically
flawed. 260 It is factually inaccurate because new rules have evolved
and a number of institutions have been specifically mandated over
the years.26 1 It is analytically flawed because the UN Guiding
Principles do more than merely restate preexisting rules: they correct
at least seventeen areas of insufficient protection for IDPs and fill
about eight gaps in international human rights and humanitarian
law. 262 Among these new substantive rights are the right not to be
forcibly displaced or forcibly returned to the area of danger, the right
to restitution or compensation for property lost because of
displacement, special guarantees for displaced women and children,
and rules against internment of IDPs. 263 Although Cohen eventually
concedes that these rules have not become binding as general
international law because of the obvious concerns over sovereignty,
she points to instances where the Guiding Principles have been made
binding at regional and national levels. 264
Cohen also notes that IDPs, as a distinct category, were put
under the competence of several institutions, including the UN
Emergency Relief Coordinator. 265 A special Internal Displacement
Unit was also created, followed by an Internal Displacement
Division. 266 In 2007, the UN adopted the "cluster approach," which
assigns specific duties to various UN agencies depending on the

See id. at 371-72 (stating that "there were many other important and
257.
legitimate reasons why IDPs came onto the international agenda"). She notes that
growth in the number of IDPs from 1.2 million in the 1980s to approximately 25 million
in 1995 was an important factor that attracted greater attention to the issue of
displaced peoples. Id. at 372.
258.
Id.
Id. at 373.
259.
260.
Id.
Id. at 372-73.
261.
Id. at 373.
262.
Id. at 372.
263.
See id. at 372-73 (citing Jessica Whyndham, A Developing Trend: Laws
264.
and Policies on Internal Displacement, 14 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 7, 8 (2006)) (pointing to the
African Great Lakes Region Protocol on the Protection and Assistance to Internally
Displaced Persons, and noting that at the national level, the Guiding Principles have
been incorporated into the national laws of Angola, Burundi, Colombia, Georgia,
Liberia, Peru, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and Uganda).
265.
Cohen, supra note 214, at 374.
266.
Id.
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phase of displacement. 267 Under this approach, while the UNHCR
would have the principal responsibility for the management of
displacement camps and emergency shelters, the UN Development
Programme would be responsible for reintegration efforts after
return. 26 8 Other agencies are assigned to specific needs such as
health and sanitation. 269 This approach is more or less the same as
the UN's approach to refugee situations, where a number of UN
agencies and NGOs assume varying responsibilities, from camp
management to providing food.27 0
Having made these observations, Cohen ends on a strong note:
Academics and some practitioners may continue to insist on the
primacy of the refugee category and deny legitimacy to that of internal
displacement, but their arguments are bound to be seen as ever more
irrelevant to the challenges of a new century.
Above all, it is important not to fight over who should have priority
but to respond to the legitimate protection and assistance needs of both
refugees and IDPs with specific instruments that are most likely to
achieve the goal of ensuring that they can regain and secure the
271
enjoyment of their rights and their human dignity.

B. Reflection on Hathaway v. Cohen
The difference between Hathaway and Cohen is more
fundamental than their specific arguments suggest. In fact, they
come from different paradigms. Hathaway seems to compare the
circumstances of an Iranian dissident seeking asylum in Arlington,
Virginia, to the circumstances of a Hurricane Katrina victim
sheltered in Atlanta, Georgia, 272 while Cohen's model compares a
Sudanese refugee in Chad with a Sudanese IDP right across the
unmarked, imaginary, colonial boundary between Chad and
Because they are talking about two different
Sudan. 27 3
circumstances, their dispute is almost false. In other words, they
could be reconciled if they only give their respective arguments a
geographic focus. To explore this further and to link it to the AU's
new initiative, it is important to look at the points of contention in
more detail. Hathaway's arguments and Cohen's responses could

Id. at 373.
267.
Id. at 374.
268.
Id. at 373.
269.
Id.
270.
Id. at 375.
271.
See Hathaway, supra note 7, at 366 (stating that "[i]nternal forced
272.
migrants will be in flight for many of the same reasons as refugees" in the broader
context of de-emphasizing the issue of asylum destination).
See generally Cohen, supra note 214 (concentrating primarily on
273.
nationality, irrespective of potential clashes or unrealistic aspects of asylum locale).
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ultimately be reduced into four categories: (1) humanitarian
considerations of deservingness; (2) sovereignty as a barrier to the
international community's ability to protect; (3) political pragmatism;
and (4) doctrinal viability.
1.

Humanitarianism

Who is more deserving of protection, refugees or IDPs, and why?
It is impossible to answer this question categorically, without taking
the circumstances of each individual case into account. Yet, because
Hathaway could not resist the temptation of saying refugees are more
deserving than IDPs across the board, Cohen, who does not pick
sides, readily wins this argument. Hathaway's argument on this
point is, in fact, circular and too legalistic to make humanitarian
sense. He argues that refugees are doubly deserving of protection
because the risk they face is profound and it is caused by
characteristics that they cannot change, such as race and nationality,
or by characteristics, such as religion and political opinion, that are
so fundamental to their identity that they must not be required to
change.27 4 In terms of the magnitude of the risk, there is no
reasonable ground to think that the risk faced by refugees is more
profound just because refugees managed to cross international
frontiers. It depends on the circumstances. It is possible that IDPs in
certain circumstances may be at a greater danger than refugees who
actually manage to escape the country. Consider a conflict situation
in which displaced civilians are trapped between government forces
Frequently, these civilians become collateral
and rebel forces.
damage.
Hathaway's characteristics argument is circular: the protected
characteristics-race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or social
group-are considered more important because refugee law says they
are more important.2 7 5 The political process that incorporated these
characteristics into refugee law is a product of its time and is
essentially Eurocentric. 276 It does not necessarily follow that all of
these characteristics, from a purely humanitarian perspective, are
more valuable than other characteristics-such as extreme poverty,
disability, or lack of political opinion-that are not recognized
grounds for protection under refugee law. Therefore, there is a
fundamental flaw in Hathaway's argument that refugees are more

Hathaway, supra note 7, at 352.
274.
See UN Refugees Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(A)(2) (defining "refugee").
275.
See 1 GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 1, at 102-16 (detailing the drafting
276.
history of the definition).
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deserving of protection because they are persecuted because of
characteristics recognized by refugee law.
Cohen did not need to go to West Darfur and Chad to
demonstrate that persons who qualify for refugee status are not
necessarily more deserving. Refugee law jurisprudence in the
developed world is full of cases where individuals who are clearly
more deserving of protection on humanitarian grounds are denied
asylum because they do not fall under any of the five enumerated
grounds. 277 Fidelity to these five grounds leads some of the highest
judicial authorities to arrive at decisions that seem almost frivolous.
For example, in the U.S. Supreme Court case INA v. EliasZacarias, the asylum seeker was a native of Guatemala. 278 He
sought asylum on the basis of the future likelihood of persecution on
account of his political opinion. 279 The record describes his claim in
the following terms:
[A]round the end of January in 1987, two armed, uniformed guerrillas
with handkerchiefs covering part of their faces came to his home. Only
he and his parents were there. ... [T]he guerrillas asked his parents
and himself to join with them, but they all refused. The guerrillas
asked them why and told them that they would be back, and that they
should think it over about joining them. [Elias-Zacarias] did not want
to join the guerrillas because the guerrillas are against the government
and he was afraid that the government would retaliate against him and
his family if he did join the guerrillas. [H]e left Guatemala at the end
of March [1987] . . . because he was afraid that the guerrillas would
return.

280

The Court considered whether Elias-Zacarias held a political opinion
within the meaning of the refugee definition:
Even a person who supports a guerrilla movement might resist
recruitment for a variety of reasons-fear of combat, a desire to remain
with one's family and friends, a desire to earn a better living in civilian
life, to mention only a few. The record in the present case not only
failed to show a political motive on Elias-Zacarias' part; it showed the
opposite. He testified that he refused to join the guerrillas because he
was afraid that the government would retaliate against him and his
family if he did so. Nor is there any indication (assuming, arguendo, it
would suffice) that the guerrillas erroneously believed that Elias281
Zacarias' refusal was politically based.

See, e.g., Gonzales v. Tchoukhrova, 549 U.S. 801 (2006) (vacating the Ninth
277.
Circuit's finding that disabled children deserved protection as belonging to a particular
social group); In re A-T, 24 I. & N. Dec. 296, 302-04 (B.I.A. 2007) (holding that young
women opposed to arranged marriage do not constitute a social group, but the decision
was later reversed on different grounds).
278.
502 U.S. 478, 479 (1992).
Id. at 479-80.
279.
Id. at 480.
280.
Id. at 482.
281.
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As a result, he was found not to be a refugee. 282 If Elias-Zacarias,
who was eighteen then, had said that he hated the guerrillas because
they killed people and that he also hated the government because it
killed people, the Court might have qualified him for refugee status.
Justice Scalia, who wrote the opinion for the majority, simply read
the law the way it was written; he did not consider it his job to select
deserving individuals for protection.2 83 However, neither Justice
Scalia nor Hathaway would likely win a policy debate on whether,
refugee law aside, Elias-Zacarias deserved protection.
Perhaps a more pertinent example is the Supreme Court's
decision in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council,284 decided just a year
after Elias-Zacarias.28 5 The principal issue in Sale was whether a
state may gather fleeing refugees from the high seas and return them
without violating the basic refugee-law principle of non-refoulement
or non-return. 286
The facts of this case are simple: when the number of desperate
Haitian refugees fleeing persecution and violence onboard
unseaworthy boats increased in the early 1990s, President George H.
W. Bush authorized the U.S. Coast Guard to interdict and return the
refugees to Haiti, where it was known that their life or freedom would
be threatened.2 87 The Government argued that the interdiction
program did not violate the non-refoulement principle. 288 By the time
the case reached the Supreme Court, President Clinton was in office,
but his Attorney General, Janet Reno, maintained the same
position. 289
The Supreme Court agreed with her. 290 Writing for the majority,
Justice Stevens said, "This case presents a painfully common
situation in which desperate people, convinced that they can no
longer remain in their homeland, take desperate measures to escape.
Although the human crisis is compelling, there is no solution to be

282.
283.

Id. at 481.
Id. at 479.

284.
285.

509 U.S. 155 (1993).
Elias-Zacarias,502 U.S. 478.

286.
See 509 U.S. at 158-59 (noting that the principle of non-refoulement is
contained in Article 33(1) of the Refugees Convention); UN Refugees Convention, supra
note 1, art. 33(1) ("No contracting state shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in
any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would
be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion.").
287.
Sale, 509 U.S. at 158.
288.
Id. at 160.
289.
Brief for Petitioner at 1, Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155
(1993) (No. 92-344).
290.
See Sale, 509 U.S. at 155-88 (providing a detailed discussion of the
principle of non-return in light of relevant provisions of the Immigration and
Nationality Act as well as the Refugee Convention).
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found in a judicial remedy."291 Justice Stevens explained that this is
because the word "return" does not apply to refugees who have not
managed to reach U.S. territory.2 9 2 Therefore, those who manage to
elude the Coast Guard and reach the United States may apply for
asylum. However, like Justice Scalia in the Elias-Zacarias case,
Justice Stevens read the law as written; he readily acknowledged
that he could not win a policy debate on grounds of humanitarianism
or deservingness. 29 3
The returned Haitians were denied refugee status while those
who eluded the Coast Guard might have been granted refugee status,
but there is no reason to think that those who eluded the Coast
Guard are more deserving of refugee protection than those who are
caught and returned. Similarly, there is no reason that displaced
persons who are able to convince a judge because of excellent
representation are more deserving than those who appear pro se and
get deported for failing to qualify for asylum. 294
In the face of this kind of complexity, Hathaway's argument that
refugees are more deserving than non-refugee forced migrants is
fundamentally flawed. As indicated earlier, it is impossible to say
that certain groups are more deserving without considering the
specific circumstances of each case. Some refugees may be more
deserving than other refugees or IDPs, and some IDPs may be more
deserving than other IDPs or refugees. Thus, deservingness cannot
provide a solid doctrinal foundation for the distinct treatment of
refugees and IDPs.
2.

Sovereignty

Hathaway readily wins the sovereignty argument, but it suffers
from the same kind of circularity as his deservingness argument.
In response to Hathaway's
Consider Cohen's argument first.
argument that the international community has the "unqualified
291.
Id. at 188.
Id. at 173-77.
292.
Id. at 188; see also INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482 (1992)
293.
(requiring Elia-Zacarias to demonstrate that he had "a well-founded" fear or
persecution because of his political opinion "rather than because of his refusal to
fight").
See generally Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in
294.
Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295 (2007) (demonstrating that the disparity in
asylum grant rates is well documented: refugees from the same country facing the
same circumstances have significantly varied success rates in the United States, and
grant rates depend on such factors as the presence of representation and the race,
gender, and prior work experience of the adjudicating officer or the judge); Stephen H.
Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum and Limits of Consistency,
60 STAN. L. REv. 413 (2007) (providing a commentary on the study at the center of the
Ramji-Nogales piece).
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ability" to provide protection to refugees but not to IDPs who are
within the sovereign authority of their own state, Cohen is limited to
citing grave circumstances where the international community may
be allowed to intervene.2 95 Although she cites instances of Chapter
VII humanitarian intervention by the UN Security Council, 29 6 she
fails to develop the argument fully, 297 perhaps because the
jurisprudence does not completely support her position. Writing
about the state of international law on humanitarian intervention,
Professor Louis Henkin points out that:
Serious efforts to develop "some form of collective intervention" began
soon after the end of the Cold War, when it ceased to be hopeless to
pursue collective intervention by authority of the UN Security Council.
In 1991 and 1992, the Security Council authorized military
intervention for humanitarian purposes in Iraq and Somalia. In
principle, those interventions were not justified as "humanitarian" (a
term that does not appear in the UN Charter); the theory supporting
such actions was that some internal wars, at least when accompanied
by war crimes, and massive human rights violations and other crimes
against humanity even if unrelated to war, may threaten international
peace and security and therefore were within the jurisdiction and were
the responsibility of the Security Council under Chapters VI and VII of
the Charter. Of course, under Article 27(3) of the Charter, a Security
Council resolution to authorize intervention, like other "nonprocedural"
matters, was subject to veto by any permanent member. Thus, by the
sum (or product) of law and politics, humanitarian intervention by any
state was prohibited; humanitarian intervention was permissible if
authorized by the Security Council, but a single permanent member
298
could prevent such authorization.

Although the Security Council intervened with arguable success in
Somalia and Iraq, it did not even attempt to intervene in the face of
ongoing genocide in the former Yugoslavia. 29 9 Its inaction in Kosovo
prompted NATO to act without Security Council authorization.30 0
Although Professor Henkin does not hesitate to say that NATO's

Cohen, supranote 214, at 372.
295.
296.
Article 42, paragraph 1 of the UN Charter allows the Security Council to
intervene through the use of force:
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41
[other measures not involving the use of force] would be inadequate or have
proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as
may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such
action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea,
or land forces of Members of the United Nations.
U.N. Charter art. 42, para. 1.
Cohen, supra note 214, at 371.
297.
298.
Louis Henkin, Kosovo and the Law of HumanitarianIntervention, 93 AM. J.
INT'L L. 824, 825 (1999).
299.
Id. at 825 n.4.
300.
Id.
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action in Kosovo was illegal on a technical level under the UN
Charter, he proposes an amendment to the UN Charter to facilitate
collective intervention in circumstances of aggression or gross human
rights violations.30 1
Therefore, consistent with Professor Hathaway's argument, the
law and practice of the UN suggest that humanitarian intervention
for the protection of IDPs is not a viable option at this time.
However, Hathaway's argument has fundamental problems that
Cohen does not raise. First, his argument that the international
community has an "unqualified ability" to protect refugees 302 is both
factually and doctrinally false.
The argument is factually false because the international
community cannot do any more to protect refugees from rights
violations in the state that receives refugees than it can do to protect
IDPs in their home state. Violating the rights of refugees or failing to
recognize refugees may violate an international obligation under the
Refugee Convention, but states determine asylum eligibility based on
their own domestic laws.30 3 If their domestic laws are inconsistent
with the Refugee Convention, the Convention merely becomes one
more violated human rights instrument.
States that do not respect the rights of their own citizens are
arguably more likely to violate the rights of refugees in their
territory. If the international community cannot protect IDPs, it

301.

Id. at 828.

Kosovo demonstrates yet again a compelling need to address the deficiencies in
the law and practice of the UN Charter. The sometimes-compelling need for
humanitarian intervention (as at Kosovo), like the compelling need for
responding to interstate aggression (as against Iraq over Kuwait), brings home
again the need for responsible reaction to gross violations of the Charter, or to
massive violations of human rights, by responsible forces acting in the common
interest. We need Article 43 agreements for standby forces responsible to the
Security Council, but neither action by the Security Council under Article 42,
nor collective intervention as by NATO at Kosovo, can serve without some
modification in the law and the practice of the veto. The NATO action in
Kosovo, and the proceedings in the Security Council, may reflect a step toward
a change in the law, part of the quest for developing "a form of collective
intervention" beyond a veto-bound Security Council. That may be a desirable
change, perhaps even an inevitable change. And it might be achieved without
formal amendment of the Charter (which is virtually impossible to effect), by a
"gentlemen's agreement" among the permanent members, or by wise selfrestraint and acquiescence. That, some might suggest, is what the law ought to
be, and proponents of a "living Charter" would support an interpretation of the
law and an adaptation of UN procedures that rendered them what they ought
to be. That might be the lesson of Kosovo.
Id.
Hathaway, supranote 7, at 353.
302.
303.
For an analysis that fails to take into account domestic consideration of
asylum eligibility, see Henkin, supra note 298, at 828.
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cannot protect refugees in the same state.30 4 One might be tempted
to suggest that the UNHCR, in its capacity as a monitoring body,
could come to the aid of the refugees. In reality, the UNHCR's
capacity to help is no greater than the capacity of any other UN
Charter-based or treaty-based human right monitoring body.3 05
The "unqualified ability" argument is doctrinally false because
sovereignty, as a shield against the international community's
intervention, could be invoked easily by states that abuse refugees. 306
Doctrinally, there is nothing that would prevent a state that violates
the rights of its own citizens and hides behind its sovereignty from
doing the same when it violates the rights of refugees in its territory.
In practical terms, the violating state is unlikely to be deterred by its
accession to the Refugee Convention. If anything, the state has
significantly less responsibility to refugees than to its own citizens. In
reality, the international community has no option but to witness
outrageous manipulations of the law, as exemplified by the Sale case,
or more outright violations, all in the name of sovereignty.
A simple question exemplifies this problem: how is the
international community's ability to protect Chadian refugees
encamped in Western Darfur better than its ability to protect
Sudanese IDPs in the same camp? The simple answer is that it is not
better. The Sudanese government could invoke its sovereignty to
disallow access to refugees and IDPs alike.30 7 A decision on
humanitarian intervention, which is often dictated by the gravity of
the violations, is not likely to be significantly impacted by whether

See Won Kidane, An Injury to the Citizen, a Pleasure to the State: Peculiar
304.
Challenges to the Enforcement of International Refugee Law, 6 CHI.-KENT J. IN'TL &
COmP. L. 116 (2006) (discussing that in terms of enforcement there are less options in
the refugee context). A refugee by definition is a person who has severed his
connections with his state of nationality or habitual residence. Id. As such, his state is
unlikely to seek redress against the state of refuge if the refugee suffers violations
there. Id.
305.
See Human Rights Bodies, UN HUMAN RIGHTS-OFFICE OF THE HIGH
COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRbodies/Pages/HumanRights
Bodies.aspx (last visited Jan. 5, 2011) (listing the various organs, their functions, and
their similar capacities).
Contra, e.g., Henkin, supra note 298, at 828 (arguing for the effectiveness of
306.
state action).
Contra id. at 824-25.
307.
[T]he principles of law, and the interpretations of the Charter, that prohibit
unilateral humanitarian intervention do not reflect a conclusion that the
"sovereignty" of the target state stands higher in the scale of values of
contemporary international society than the human rights of its inhabitants to
be protected from genocide and massive crimes against humanity.
Id.
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the victims are refugees, IDPs, or another category of persons.30 8 It is
thus fair to conclude that the international community's ability to
provide protection to one but not to the other is doctrinally untenable.
In addition, it could plausibly be argued that internal
displacement is, in fact, a "symptom of state dysfunction"
undermining the claim of full sovereignty over a maladministered
territory and population.3 09 In Africa, for example, claims for
autonomy and self-determination do not necessarily correspond to
recognized international boundaries because the boundaries were
demarcated without considering the ethnic and other demographic
characteristics of the people directly involved.3 10 This may explain
why challenges to central authority are frequent in Africa, the
These
continent most affected by internal displacement. 311
uncertainties threaten control over territory, the central attribute of
sovereignty. 312 A state's claim of sovereignty over a territory that it
does not control cannot be as strong as its claim over territories that
Internal displacement is often a "physical
it does control.
manifestation of political challenges to the authority of the
state.

...

It not only stems from weak or failed states, but also

contributes to the phenomenon as it alters the ethnic and political
balance in the country."3 1 3 Accordingly, sovereignty cannot be an
insurmountable doctrinal obstacle to defining the legal status of IDPs
under international law.
3.

Political Pragmatism

Hathaway's concern over the political pragmatism of merging
IDP and refugee law seems to be twofold. 314 First, he is concerned
about the increasing recognition of the IDP category and whether
durable solutions associated with it will incentivize states to close
their borders under the pretense of helping IDPs, thus escaping

Cf. id. at 827 (failing to consider that, although it might be argued that
308.
cross-border movement is more appropriate as a measure of disturbance of
international peace and security for the purpose of the Security Council's decision to
invoke its Chapter VII intervention powers, a serious IDPs crisis could easily provide
the justification).
CATHERINE PHUONG, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF INTERNALLY
309.
DISPLACED PERSONS 209 (2004).
310.
See generally Cohen, supra note 214, at 372-73 (noting that, at the national
level, the Guiding Principles of the African Great Lakes Region Protocol on the
Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons have been incorporated into
the national laws of Angola, Burundi, Colombia, Georgia, Liberia, Peru, the
Philippines, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and Uganda, extending autonomy beyond borders).
311.
PHOUNG, supra note 309, at 210.
Id. at 211.
312.
313.
Id.
314.
Hathaway, supranote 7, at 358.
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criticism for their humanitarian record. 315 As discussed above, he
illustrates this concern by reference to Western Europe's response to
the collapse of the former Yugoslavia. 316 Second, he seems concerned
that a shift of attention from refugees to IDPs is a lose-lose
proposition, simply because states will be more willing to help if the
burden is smaller.3 17 In other words, if states are asked to assist
IDPs in addition to refugees, instead of helping both groups, they
might think that the burden is just too much to carry and abandon
their efforts all together.
Cohen's response to the first concern is that the recent
inhospitality to refugees has its own independent sources that are not
likely to be exasperated or mitigated by increasing attention to
IDPs.318 On the second point, Cohen seems to think that the
She asserts that each person with
proposition is win-win.31 9
to protection without regard to
would
be
entitled
humanitarian needs
and
that the political reality is
nationality,
their location and
because
humanitarian attention is
legal
reality
different from the
given to problems based on their gravity. 320 She argues that the
reality on the ground prompted the perceived shift in attention to
IDPs. 32 1 In other words, states are more likely to help when the
actual need is greater, regardless of the legal status.
Cohen seems to have the better argument on the political
pragmatism point.
First, the IDP train cannot be stopped;
attempting to stop the train is less pragmatic than riding in it.
Second, the history of refugee law suggests that the admission and
recognition of refugees is more dependent on the political reality of
the time than humanitarian considerations. 322 The fact that IDPs
are recognized as a legal category for protection somewhere around
the world is not likely to affect the decision of an immigration judge
Said
adjudicating an asylum claim in a developed country.
differently, judges are not likely to be stricter on asylum adjudication
just because they have heard that there is a new group of people with
legal status analogous to refugees.
Ultimately, on the issue of political pragmatism, Hathaway's
position could be characterized as pessimistic and Cohen's position
could be characterized as optimistic. Hathaway is a pessimist
because he seems to think that if states add this class of persons to

315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

Id.
Id. at 359.
Id.
Cohen, supra note 214, at 372.
Id. at 373.
Id.
Id. at 371-72.
Id. at 372.
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the refugee category, refugees would lose their distinct identity and
become a part of a larger group of hopeless human rights victims. 32 3
His argument seems motivated by his desire to save at least some
people from neglect. 32 4 His selection criterion is the Refugee
Convention's definition of a refugee. 325 Cohen is optimistic because
she seems to think that all displaced persons could ultimately be
helped if the right set of rules and institutions are put in place. 32 6
When pessimism and optimism compete, the winner can only be
determined by time.
4.

Doctrinal Viability

For Hathaway, neither new binding rules nor new institutions
have been established because the IDP legal category is not
doctrinally viable. 327 His "view is that the paucity of concrete
progress in achieving rights and remedies to forced migration
suggests the non-viability of the forced migration label. It groups
together two sets of persons-refugees and the internally displacedwho in fact share little other than the shared symptoms of
involuntary movement."3 2 8 His doctrinal viability argument goes
further and suggests that IDPs cannot have a legal status separate
from the general population facing similar human rights
violations. 329 For him, dislocation within one's own country is not a
legally significant event warranting the development of norms akin to
refugee law for the benefit of IDPs. 330
Cohen seems to think that dislocation within one's own country
could be a legally significant factor because it raises the dislocated
person's vulnerability to human rights violations.3 3 1 Moreover, she
believes that there is no principled reason not to allow the
development of normative mechanisms akin to refugee law to resolve
this predicament.3 3 2
Hathaway and Cohen are not alone in their respective positions.
They are representatives of two competing camps with extraordinary
voices. One other example from each camp is worth reciting. In

Hathaway, supra note 7, at 353.
323.
324.
See id. (discussing the importance of refugee autonomy in the refugee
protection process).
325.
UN Refugees Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(A)(2).
326.
Cohen, supra note 214, at 372.
Hathaway, supra note 7, at 359-60.
327.
Id. at 359.
328.
Id. at 360.
329.
Id. at 361.
330.
Cohen, supra note 214, at 372.
331.
Id. at 373.
332.
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support of the distinct treatment of refugees and IDPs, leading
international refugee law expert Guy Goodwin-Gill writes:
There are practical, political, and principled reasons for distancing
UNHCR from the problems of the internally displaced. It is the very
status of the refugee as a refugee in international law that opens the
statutory, legal door to the protection of his or her rights. In a society
of independent, sovereign nation-states, internationally relevant
judicial facts, such as cross-border movement, still retain their
importance. And other consequences will likely flow. For one, the
distinctive quality enjoyed by the refugee as a subject entitled to
Rights, duties, and
international protection will be erased.
responsibilities will be eradicated, and the refugee left once more
3 33
unprotected in an era of uncontrolled and uncontrollable discretion.

Cohen's camp is reinforced by T. Alexander Aleinikoff, who
recently transitioned from the academy to become the Deputy High
Commissioner of the UNHCR. In 1993, he expressed his opinion in
the following terms:
The international "refugee" model starts with a person outside his or
her state of origin. This notion, of course, represents the traditional
(and now outdated) view that international law could offer protection
only to someone beyond the territorial borders-and therefore outside
the "sovereignty" of her home country. But it is not at all clear what
distinguishes classic refugees from persons who have fled to safety
within their country, a group of people usually described as the
"internally displaced." Nor is the distinction clear-at least in human
rights terms-between those two categories of persons who, unable to
334
flee serious harm, suffer at home.

According to Professor Aleinikoff, "[u]nder [a] coerced migration
model, the key is flight from harm. As such, it should embrace the
internally displaced as well as the border crossers.

. .

. [It] directly

addresses the multifaceted nature of the phenomena ... [and] it
identifies loss of community as the fundamental harm."335 Having
noted the extraordinary amount of scholarly attention paid to the
definition of a refugee, particularly the "on account of' prong of the
definition, he argues that "[b]y focusing our attention on helping a
small number of the world's involuntarily displaced obtain this potent
form of relief [refugee status], we miss opportunities to propose and
analyze policies that might benefit millions more." 3 36

333.

Guy Goodwin-Gill, UNHCR and Internal Displacement: Stepping Into a

Legal Minefield, 2000 World Refugee Survey, in MARTIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 25, 2631.

T. Alexander Aleinikoff, From 'Refugee Law" to the "Law of Coerced
334.
Migration,"9 AM U. J. INT'L L & POL'Y 25, 27 (1994).
Id.
335.
Id. He adds that the privileging of refugee status tends to depreciate the
336.
legitimate claims for relief of other coerced migrants, whose attempts to flee serious
harm are frequently referred to as irregular movements or mass flows. Everyday
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Although, as shown by the AU Convention, the world seems to be
moving towards Cohen's camp at an accelerated speed, the doctrinal
and practical issues raised by Hathaway's camp are not likely to fade
into the background any time soon. They require proper examination
and principled responses.3 37
The following Part examines the
important provisions of the AU Convention in light of the doctrinal
and practical issues discussed at length in this and previous sections.
IV. RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE

AU CONVENTION

The AU Convention transforms what had remained "soft law" for
more than a decade into "hard law," defining rights and
responsibilities. 33 8 It treats IDPs as subjects of rights instead of just
victims of circumstances.3 3 9 As a corollary to these rights, it places
specific obligations on states and non-state actors. 340 This Part
critically appraises the nature of these rights and responsibilities and
the manners of their enforcement envisaged under the Convention.

language reflects these differences: the term "displaced persons" invokes less urgency,
less of a sense of concern, than "refugees." Id. at 28. A collection of essays edited by
Aleinikoff shed more light on the state of international law in the areas of migration.
See generally T. ALEXANDER ALIENIKOFF & VINCENT CHETAIL, MIGRATION AND
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL NORMS (2003).

For some important scholarly contributions to this doctrinal solution, see
337.
generally ROBERTA COHEN & FRANCIS M. DENG, MASSES IN FLIGHT: THE GLOBAL CRISIS
OF INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT (1998); Maria Stavropoulou, Displacement and Human
Rights: Reflections on UN Practice, 20 HUM. RTs. Q. 515 (1998). For a good collection of
essays on the topic, see also HUMAN RIGHTS AND FORCED DISPLACEMENT (Anne F.
Bayefsky & Joan Fitzpatrick eds., 2000). Another set of instructive essays, essentially
disregarding the supposed distinction between refugees, IDPs, and other victims of
human rights violations, is also available in HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION FOR
REFUGEES, ASYLUM-SEEKERS, AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS: A GUIDE TO

INTERNATIONAL MECHANISMS AND PROCEDURES (Joan Fitzpatrick ed., 2002).
See Chaloka Beyani, The Politics of InternationalLaw: Transformation of
338.

the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement from Soft Law Into Hard Law, 102
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 194, 195 (2008) (noting the prospective hardening effect of the

Draft Convention).
339.

See id. at 194.

[T]hese Guidelines represent the use of soft law as a means of constructing a
coherent framework of reference in which disparate aspects of hard
international law deriving from international humanitarian law, human rights,
and refugee law by analogy, are brought to bear on the protection of internally
displaced persons in international law.

Id.
See AU Convention, supra note 9, arts. 3-13 (placing duties on states
340.
parties and international institutions).
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A. Background on the African Collective Rights Paradigm
In its simplest form, a right can be seen as a legal relationship
between at least two persons that gives rise to an enforceable claim of
action or forbearance by one against the other. 341 In this kind of legal
relationship, disobedience subjects the disobeying party to penalty
and the victim to redress. 342
However, the conception of human rights is more complicated
than this notion of an enforceable claim. Dean Makau Mutua
characterizes the Western conception of human rights as the
reflection of the Lockean theory of contractual transfer of individual
autonomy to a public authority in exchange for the protection of
individual rights and freedoms. 343 Furthermore, Dean Mutua argues
that the Western notion of individual rights has a particular
historical context linked to the rise of the nation-state in Europe. 344
Individual rights were meant to be a guarantee against the nation345
state, which was allowed to monopolize all instruments of coercion.
In Africa, the relationships between individuals, groups, and
states did not evolve in the same way as in Europe and did not result
from the natural evolution of the various ethno-political
Mutua writes that "[ciommunities that lived
communities. 346
independently of each other were coerced to live together under
newly-created colonial states. Most of these new citizens lacked any
institutional or nationalistic bond to the colonial state." 347 He also
notes that the forced "unnatural" conglomeration of distinct
communities greatly contributed to the instability of the modern
African state:
This disconnection, between the people and the modern African state, is
not merely a function of the loss of independence or self-governance
over pre-colonial political and social structure and radical imposition of
new territorial bounds with unfamiliar citizenry. It is above all a crisis
of cultural and philosophical identity: the delegitimation of values,

341.
167 (1919)
342.
343.

See Arthur L. Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology, 29 YALE L.J. 163,
(outlining several varieties of rights).
Id.
See Makau Wa Mutua, The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural

Fingerprint:An Evaluation of the Language of Duties, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 339, 342
(1995).
Id.
344.
Id. at 342.
345.
346.
Id. at 342-43. For a more comprehensive discussion of this issue, see
generally OLOFIMI TAfW6, HOW COLONIALISM PREEMPTED MODERNITY IN AFRICA 158233 (2010).
Mutua, supra note 343, at 343.
347.
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notions, and philosophies about the individual, society, and nature
348
developed over centuries.

Mutua's claims up to this point are not seriously disputed, but he
also concludes that the contemporary Eurocentric articulation of
human rights that sees the individual alone as the bearer of rights
and responsibilities is necessarily incomplete in addressing injustice
in Africa. 349 This contention is not without controversy, but it seems
35 0
to underpin the African conception of collective rights.
The African conception of collective rights is best described by
John Mbiti as "I am because we are, and because we are therefore I
am."351 The prevailing contemporary approaches to human rights in
Africa reflect this notion of collectivity. 352 The principal African
human rights instrument, the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights, recognizes the peoples' or collective rights and
emphasizes economic, social, and cultural rights as preconditions for
the enjoyment of civil and political rights. 353 This approach has been

348.
Id.
Id. at 344.
349.
Interestingly, one of the strong voices that tends to disagree with this
350.
conclusion is Francis Deng. He writes: "To arrogate the concept to only certain groups,
cultures, or civilizations is to aggravate divisiveness on the issue, to encourage
defensiveness or unwarranted self-justification on the part of the excluded, and to
impede progress toward a universal consensus on human rights." Francis M. Deng, A
Cultural Approach to Human Rights Among the Dinka, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA:
CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 261, 261 (Abdullahi A. An-Na'im & Francis M. Deng
eds., 1990).
351.

JOHN MBITI, AFRICAN RELIGIONS AND PHILOSOPHY 141 (2d ed. 1990).

See Mutua, supra note 343, at 363 (discussing the unity between social
352.
values and conceptions of individual rights in both pre- and post-colonial African legal
structures).
See African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981,
353.
1520 U.N.T.S. 245, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) [hereinafter Banjul Charter].
Recognizing on the one hand, that fundamental human rights stem from the
attributes of human beings which justifies their national and international
protection and on the other hand that the reality and respect of peoples' rights
should necessarily guarantee human rights ... considering that ... the
satisfaction of economic, social and cultural rights is a guarantee for the
enjoyment of civil and political rights.
Id. While Articles 1-18 of the Charter enumerate the rights of "[e]very individual" in
familiar terms, Articles 19-23 set forth the rights of "[a]ll [p]eoples," the most
significant being the right to self-determination provided under Article 20. Id. arts. 123. It reads, "All peoples shall have the right to existence. They shall have the
unquestionable and inalienable right to self-determination. They shall freely determine
their political status and shall pursue their economic and social development according
to the policy they have freely chosen." Id. art. 20. The African Charter's approach to
human and peoples' rights, and the right to self-determination in particular, has been a
source of significant scholarly interest. See, e.g., El-Obaid Ahmed El-Obaid & Kwadwo
Appiagyei-Atu, Human Rights in Africa-A New Perspective on Linking the Past to the
Present, 41 McGILL L.J. 819 (1996) (advocating the right to self-determination as a
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described as a mix of tradition and modernity. 354 It unifies the three
generations of human rights: liberal rights (civil and political),
egalitarian rights (socioeconomic and cultural), and solidarity rights
(collective rights).35 5 The AU Convention is squarely predicated on
and derives its legitimacy from these African notions of human and
peoples' rights. The following sections provide a detailed analysis of
the specific rights and duties set forth under the Convention.
B. Perspectives on the AU Convention
Unlike the UN Guiding Principles, which approach displacement
from the perspective of the IDPS, 356 the AU Convention approaches
the problem from the perspective of the obligations of states and nonstate actors. 35 7 In other words, while the Guiding Principles define
the rights of the IDPs, with few exceptions, the Convention does not
define rights but provides for the obligations of the states and nonstate actors not to violate rights presumed to exist independently. 35 8
The difference in the two approaches is best exemplified by their
respective statements on arbitrary displacement. Principle 1 of the
UN Guiding Principles provides that "[i]nternally displaced persons
shall enjoy, in full equality, the same rights and freedoms under
international and domestic law as do other persons in their country.
They shall not be discriminated against in the enjoyment of any
rights and freedoms on the ground that they are internally
displaced."35 9
The AU Convention restates the same principle in two ways:
first, as the obligation of states, declaring that "States Parties shall[]
refrain from, prohibit and prevent arbitrary displacement of
feasible solution to the problem of unstable and undemocratic governance). Collective
rights in the sense of self-determination and, more particularly, in the sense of the
right to secession, are a subject of great controversy because the definition of the "self'
is problematic. For a good analysis of this issue and an argument in favor of common
historical reference as a fundamental component of secessionist acts, see generally Lea
Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination:A TerritorialInterpretation,16 YALE J.
INT'L L. 177 (1991), and a follow-up piece, Lea Brilmayer, Commentaries on Lea
Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation, 16 Yale J.
Int'l L. 177 (1991): Secession and Self-Determination: One Decade Later, 25 YALE J.
INT'L L. 283 (2000).
Nsongurua J. Udombana, Between Promise and Performance: Revisiting
354.
States' Obligations Under the African Human Rights Charter,40 STAN. J. INT'L L. 105,
109 (2004).
355.
Id. at 112.
356.
See KALIN, supranote 8, at 2.
357.
See AU Convention, supra note 9, arts. 3-13 (generally placing obligations
for compliance upon states parties and other international institutions).
See, e.g., id. arts. 3-14 (generally defining particular obligations of
358.
institutional actors).
Guiding Principles, supra note 8, princ. 1.
359.
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populations,"360 and second, as the right of IDPs, asserting that "[a]ll
persons have a right to be protected against arbitrary
displacement."3 61 The latter provision is the only provision in the
Convention that frames a right in a positive manner. All the other
provisions are framed in the form of the states' obligations rather
than as the rights of individuals. 362 The framing of rights and
obligations in this manner is a significant departure from common
human rights treaty language, where the rights are often framed
either in the form of a negative right, as in the right to be free of
government interference, or in the form of a positive right, such as an
entitlement to certain benefits. Although the distinction between
positive and negative rights is a subject of immense philosophical
controversy 363 and largely outside the scope of this Article, it is
important to note some of the philosophical underpinnings of the
distinction because the Convention conspicuously has taken a unique
approach, with the hope of overcoming some of the doctrinal problems
noted in the previous sections.
A notable legal theorist, Charles Fried, describes the distinction
between negative rights and positive rights in the following terms:
"[a] positive right is a claim to something . .. while a negative right is
a right that something not be done to one." 364 Another notable
theorist, Gerald MacCallum, dismisses the importance of the
distinction and argues that all rights and duties could fit into this
scenario: "X is (is not) free from Y to do (not do, to become, not
become) Z."3 65 Defined in negative-rights terms, it means that X, the
possessor of the right, can do Z (e.g., free speech) without the
interference of Y (which might be the government). Defined in
positive-rights terms, it could mean that X, possessor of the right, is
free from the lack of medical care, and may enjoy such right without
the interference of Y. 366
Understood this way, the difference between the approaches of
the UN Guiding Principles and the AU Convention-the definition of

AU Convention, supra note 9, art. 3(1)(a).
360.
361.
Id. art. 4(4).
Cf. id. arts. 3-18 (stating treaty provisions in terms of obligations of states
362.
parties, international organizations, and other institutional actors).
Compare Frank B. Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV.
363.
857, 863-78 (2000) (arguing that important theoretical distinctions between positive
and negative rights remain), with Jeanne M. Woods, Justiciable Social Rights As a
Critique of the Liberal Paradigm, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 763, 764-65 (2003) ("The negative
rights/positive rights distinction poses a false dichotomy; all human rights potentially
contain both positive and negative dimensions.").
364.
CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 110 (1978).
Gerald C. MacCallum, Jr., Negative and Positive Freedom, 76 PHIL. REV.
365.
312, 314 (1967).
366.
Id. at 320.
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a right versus the definition of duties-may seem unimportant. 36 7
The discussion of the specific provisions in the following sections
sheds light on why the contracting states might have chosen to frame
the AU Convention's provisions differently than the UN Guiding
Principles.
C. Who Is an IDP? Or Who Are IDPs?
Walter Kilin, the author of the Annotations to the Guiding
Principles on Internal Displacement, explicitly states that the UN
Guiding Principles do not provide a legal definition of IDPs-the
paragraph that identifies IDPs is merely descriptive. 368 The fact that
the description is placed in the introduction indicates that it is not
intended to be a legal definition. 369 The AU Convention transforms
the UN Guiding Principles' "description" into a legal definition of
IDPs by placing it under the section of definitions of terms. It defines
IDPs as
persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or
leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a
result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of
generalized violence, violations of human rights, or natural or humanmade disaster, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized
370
State border.

The Convention does not define an individual IDP. The legal
status of an individual member of the group is unclear. It is
important to note that the UN Guiding Principles approach the
problem of internal displacement from the perspective of the rights of
the displaced, but refrain from providing a legal definition. The AU
Convention, in contrast, approaches the problem from the perspective
of states and other non-state actors, but provides a legal definition of
the beneficiaries. With this feature noted, these issues are explored
further in light of some specific provisions in the following sections.
D. The Right Not to Be Displacedor the Duty Not to Displace
The right not to be displaced or the duty not to displace is the
cornerstone of the rights-based regime that the AU Convention

367.
Some argue that all rights are necessarily positive because no matter how
they are framed, they all require government action for their enforcement. See, e.g.,
STEPHEN HOLMES & CAsS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS 43 (1999).
KALIN, supra note 8, at 2-3.
368.
Id.
369.
AU Convention, supranote 9, art. 1(k).
370.
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establishes. 37 Although numerous human rights and humanitarian
law instruments recognize this right indirectly, 372 it gained its finest
expression in the UN Guiding Principles,3 73 and the AU Convention
adopted its description of this right. 374 The right not to be displaced
has never been recognized as an absolute right. First, the prohibition
pertains only to "arbitrary" displacement, meaning displacement that
is unjust, unpredictable, and unreasonable.3 75 Displacement may be
allowed as a last resort when no other meaningful alternatives are
Professor Manfred Nowak's commentary on the
available. 376
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states:
[Tihe expression 'arbitrary' suggests a violation by State organs. In
evaluating whether the interference . .. by a State enforcement organ
represents a violation . .. it must especially be reviewed whether, in
addition to conformity with national law, the specific act of enforcement
had a purpose that seems legitimate on the basis of the Covenant in its
entirety, whether it was predictable in the sense of rule of law and, in
particular, whether it was reasonable (proportional) in relation to the
377
purpose to be achieved.

The AU Convention's approach to this particular right
significantly departs from the approach of the UN Guiding Principles.
As indicated above, the AU Convention frames the right both as an
individual right and as a state responsibility: "All persons have a
right to be protected against arbitrary displacement,"3 78 and "States
Parties shall refrain from, prohibit, and prevent arbitrary

See id. art. 4(1), (4) (placing blanket affirmative obligations on states while
371.
also explicitly creating negative rights in individuals).
These instruments include the UDHR, supra note 13, art. 12 (protection
372.
from arbitrary interference with a person's privacy or home); Geneva Convention IV,
supra note 14, arts. 49, 147 (prohibition against deportation of civilians in situations of
armed conflict); ICCPR, supra note 13, arts. 12(1), 17 (freedom of movement);
Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries
(I.L.O. No. 169), art. 16, June 27, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382 (1989) [hereinafter ILO
Convention No. 169] (prohibiting the forcible displacement of indigenous people);
Banjul Charter, supra note 353, art. 12(1) (granting the freedom of movement and
prohibiting mass expulsion).
Cf. Cohen, supra note 214, at 372 (noting that the Guiding Principles are
373.
not only specifically tailored to the needs of IDPs, but they "fill grey areas and gaps in
the law").
Compare Guiding Principles, supra note 8, princs. 5-6 (offering "Principles
374.
Related to Protection from Displacement"), with AU Convention, supra note 9, arts. 34 (incorporating much of the same language).
Professor Nowak says that the term "arbitrary" implies that the action
375.
contains "elements of injustice, unpredictability and unreasonableness." MANFRED
NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY 291

(1993).
376.
377.
378.

KALIN, supranote 8, at 15.
Id. at 15-16 (quoting NOWAK, supranote 375, at 291).
AU Convention, supra note 9, art. 4(4).
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displacement of populations."3 79 The duty also extends to the
prevention of "political, social, cultural and economic exclusion and
marginalization that are likely to cause displacement of populations
or persons by virtue of their social identity, religion or political
opinion."3 80 The UN Guiding Principles use clearer terminology:
"Every human being shall have the right to be protected against
being arbitrarily displaced from his or her home or place of habitual
residence."3 8 '
There are notable differences in the specific examples that each
instrument provides.
Under the UN Guiding Principles, the
prohibition against arbitrary displacement relates, among other
things, to "cases of large-scale development projects, which are not
justified by compelling and overriding public interests." 382 The AU
Convention's provision that contains the right to be protected from
arbitrary
displacement does not cite development-related
displacement as one of the examples.3 83 Instead, the Convention
dedicated an entire provision to it.384 Interestingly, however, this
provision is qualitatively inferior. Titled "Displacement induced by
Projects," it reads in full:
States parties, as much as possible, shall prevent displacement
caused by projects . . . [and] shall ensure that the stakeholders
concerned will explore feasible alternatives, with full information and
consultation of persons likely to be displaced by projects . .. [and] shall
carry out a socio-economic and environmental impact assessment of a
385
proposed development project prior to undertaking such a project.

Where the UN Guiding Principles, consistent with international
human rights law, require "compelling and overriding public
interest,"3 86 the Convention uses the glaringly permissive "as much
as possible" language.38 7 Although the AU's concern over the serious
dilemma between development and displacement is understandable,
this low threshold appears qualitatively insufficient to guarantee
protection against arbitrary displacement of indigenous and other
underrepresented populations who are often the victims of this

379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.

Id. art. 3(1)(a).
Id. art. 3(1)(b).
Guiding Principles, supra note 8, princ. 6.
Id. princ. 6(2)(c).
AU Convention, supranote 9, art. 3.
Id. art. 10.
Id. (emphasis added).
Guiding Principles, supra note 8, princ. 6(2)(c).
AU Convention, supra note 9, art. 10(1).
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phenomenon.3 8 8
Unmistakably, this provision is a remarkable
regression from the UN Guiding Principles.
As a corollary to the right not to be displaced, the states'
obligations under the AU Convention include promoting respect for
international human rights and humanitarian law, 389 devising early
warning systems,3 90 and preventing "political, social, cultural and
economic exclusion and marginalization, that are likely to cause
displacement of populations or persons by virtue of their social
identity, religion or political opinion."3 91 The latter two provisions
are not contained in the UN Guiding Principles. The marginalization
provision is interesting because it somewhat resembles the definition
of a refugee under the Refugee Convention.3 92 This raises important
issues of enforcement, discussed in Part IV.C.
E. Rights and ResponsibilitiesDuringDisplacement
Unlike the UN Guiding Principles, the AU Convention does not
frame any of the IDPs' rights during displacement from the
perspective of the IDPs.39 3 Instead, all of the provisions are framed
from the perspective of the obligations of the states and non-state
actors.39 4
Comparing the framing of the nondiscrimination provisions is
Principle 1 of the UN Guiding Principles states:
instructive.
"Internally displaced persons shall enjoy, in full equality, the same
rights and freedoms under international and domestic law as do other
persons in their country. They shall not be discriminated against in
the enjoyment of any rights and freedoms on the ground that they are
internally displaced."395 The AU Convention states the same principle:
"States parties shall protect the rights of internally displaced
persons ... by

refraining

from,

and

preventing ... discrimination

388.
For a study highlighting that indigenous people and marginalized ethnic
minorities are disproportionately impacted by development, see supra note 136 and
accompanying text.
AU Convention, supra note 9, art. 4(1).
389.
390.
Id. art (4)(2).
391.
Id. art. 3(1)(b).
Cf. UN Refugees Convention, supra note 1, art. 1 (defining a refugee as
392.
someone outside the refugee's country and unable or unwilling to return because of a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, political
opinion, or belongingness in a particular social group).
Compare Guiding Principles, supra note 8, princ. 1 ('Internally displaced
393.
persons... shall enjoy the same rights and freedoms...."), with AU Convention,
supra note 9, art. 9 ("States parties shall protect the rights of internally displaced
persons. . .. ").
394.
AU Convention, supra note 9, arts. 5-13.
395.
Guiding Principles, supra note 8, princ. 1.
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against such persons in the enjoyment of any rights or freedoms on the
grounds that they are internally displaced persons." 396
Although these two provisions appear to be substantively the
same, procedurally an aggrieved party may have to present his or her
claim in two different ways. Under the UN Guiding Principles, a
claim for violation may be presented in the affirmative-that the
right not to be discriminated against has been violated. In this
formulation, the claimant's responsibility would be to prove that the
right has been violated. Under the AU Convention, the claim must be
framed as the state's failure to protect, which, in terms of procedure
and evidence, may be more difficult to prove.
Moreover, it
complicates the remedy because if it is a failure by the state to honor
its international obligations then the remedy is international, i.e., the
state may be required to correct its laws or otherwise comply with its
obligations. However, if the finding is a violation of individual rights,
the remedy could be as simple as compensation. Although the reason
for the AU's change in formulation seems unclear, it is probable that
the drafters thought that it would be more agreeable to most states.
The AU Convention is also less generous with socioeconomic
rights and entitlements: "States Parties shall [pirovide internally
displaced persons to the fullest extent practicable and with the least
possible delay, with adequate humanitarian assistance, which shall
include food, water, shelter, medical care, and other health services,
sanitation, education, and any other necessary social services." 39 7
The UN Guiding Principles frame the same rights in the following
broad and clear language: "All internally displaced persons have a
right to an adequate standard of living."3 98 The minimum acceptable
standard requires "competent authorities [to] provide internally
displaced persons with and ensure safe access to: (a) Essential food
and potable water; (b) Basic shelter and housing; (3) Appropriate
clothing; and (d) Essential medical services and sanitation." 399
Furthermore, the Guiding Principles explicitly state that "[e]very
human being has the right to education." 400 In addition, the
concerned authorities shall ensure that displaced children in
particular "receive education which shall be free and compulsory at
the primary level," 401 and "[e]ducation should respect their cultural
identity, language and religion." 40 2

396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.

AU Convention, supra note 9, art. 9(1)(a).
Id. art. (9)(2)(b).
Guiding Principles, supra note 8, princ. 18(1).
Id. princ. 18(2).
Id. princ. 23(1).
Id. princ. 23(2).
Id.
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The formulations of some important provisions of the UN
Guiding Principles and AU Convention contain qualitative
differences. For example, although both instruments recognize the
right not to be forcibly returned to a place where harm may be faced
within the same country, the AU Convention relegates the right to
seek asylum in other countries to the savings clause: "No provision in
this Convention shall be interpreted as affecting or undermining the
right of internally displaced persons to seek and be granted
asylum."403 The UN Guiding Principles, by contrast, explicitly
provide for asylum:
Internally displaced persons have: (a) The right to seek safety in
another part of the country; (b) The right to leave the country; (c) The
right to seek asylum in another country; and (d) The right to be
protected against forcible return to or resettlement in any place where
4 04
their life, safety, liberty and/or health would be at risk.

Although the AU Convention states the principle of internal nonrefoulement in similar terms, 405 it expressly permits restrictions to
the freedom of movement of IDPs in the interest of public safety and
health. 406
Another qualitative difference pertains to the prohibition against
recruitment of displaced persons, including children, for military
service. With respect to children, the UN Guiding Principles
categorically provide that "[i]n no circumstances shall displaced
children be recruited nor be required or permitted to take part in
hostilities." 407 With respect to all other IDPs, the UN Guiding
Principles provide, "Internally displaced persons shall be protected
against discriminatory practices of recruitment into any armed forces
or groups as a result of their displacement. In particular, any cruel,
inhuman or degrading practices that compel compliance or punish

403.
AU Convention, supra note 9, art. 20(1).
404.
Guiding Principles, supranote 8, princ. 15.
405.
See AU Convention, supra note 9, art. 9(2)(e) ("Respect and ensure the right
to seek safety in another part of the State and to be protected against forcible return to
or resettlement in any place where their life, safety, liberty andlor health would be at
risk.. . .").
Compare AU Convention, supra note 9, art. 9(2)(f) ("Guarantee the freedom
406.
of movement and choice of residence of internally displaced persons, except where
restrictions on such movement and residence are necessary, justified and proportionate
to the requirements of ensuring security for internally displaced persons or
maintaining public security, public order and public health...."), with Guiding
Principles, supra note 8, princ. 14 ("1. Every internally displaced person has the right
to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his or her resistance. 2. In particular,
internally displaced persons have the right to move freely in and out of camps or other
settlements.").
407.
Guiding Principles, supra note 8, princ. 13(1).
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in

all

circumstances."408

The AU Convention addresses the issue of recruitment in three
different provisions. With respect to children, the AU Convention
provides that states parties shall refrain from and prevent "the
recruitment of children and their use in hostilities." 40 9 Although this
provision presumably applies both to states and non-state actors, the
AU Convention's prohibition of recruitment of adult IDPs for military
service relates only to non-state armed groups. 4 10 Therefore, the
prohibition is not as categorical as the prohibition that the UN
Guiding Principles provides.
Finally, although the formulation is different and notably
awkward, the AU Convention, like the UN Guiding Principles,
recognizes the rights of IDPs to be protected from genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and other violations of human rights
and humanitarian law, including arbitrary detention and cruel and
inhumane treatments, sexual, and other gender-based violence, and
starvation.411

F. Rights and ResponsibilitiesDuringReturn and Reintegration
Under existing international human rights law, the right of
return is formulated in the context of return to one's country from
abroad. 4 12 Under international humanitarian law, the right is
formulated in the context of evacuation during occupation: Article 49
of Geneva Convention IV states that such evacuees "shall be
transferred back to their homes as soon as hostilities in the area in

Id. princ. 13(2).
408.
AU Convention, supra note 9, art. 9(1)(d).
409.
See id. art. 7(5)(e)-(f) (prohibiting only "armed groups" from recruitment of
410.
adult IDPs for military service).
Id. art. 9(b)-(e); Guiding Principles, supra note 8, princs. 10-12.
411.
See KALIN, supra note 8, at 69 (noting that "[h]uman rights law recognizes
412.
the right of an individual, outside of his or her national territory, to return to his or her
country" but that "there is no general rule in present international law that affirms the
right of internally displaced persons to return to their original place of residence or to
move to another safe place of their choice within their own country"); see, e.g., UDHR,
supra note 13, art. 13(2) ("Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and
residence within the borders of each state."); ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 12(4) ("No one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country."); African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 12(2), June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217, 21 I.L.M. 58
[hereinafter ACHPRI ("Every individual shall have the right to leave any country
including his own, and to return to his country. This right may only be subject to
restrictions, provided for by law for the protection of national security, law and order,
public health or morality."). The only notable exception is ILO Convention No. 169,
Article 16(3), which provides for the right of indigenous people to return to their
traditional lands within the same country. ILO Convention 169, supra note 372, art.
16(3).
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question have ceased." 413 Because the articulation of this right is
limited to these circumstances, the UN Guiding Principles do not go
so far as to say that IDPs have the right to return to their homes, 4 14
but rather that "[clompetent authorities have the primary duty and
responsibility to establish conditions, as well as provide the means,
which allow internally displaced persons to return voluntarily, in
safety and with dignity, to their homes or places of habitual
residence." 415
The AU Convention contains more elaborate (and perhaps
qualitatively superior) provisions relating to return. Although, unlike
the UN Guiding Principles, the AU Convention does not expressly
recognize the right of IDPs to voluntarily return, it obligates states to
"seek lasting solutions to the problem of displacement by promoting
and creating satisfactory conditions for voluntary return, local
integration or relocation on a sustainable basis and in circumstances
of safety and dignity."4 16 More importantly, it significantly enhances
the UN Guiding Principles' consultation provision, which states that
"[s]pecial efforts should be made to ensure the full participation of
internally displaced persons in the planning and management of their
return or resettlement and reintegration." 4 17 The AU Convention
states the same principle more clearly, declaring that "States Parties
shall enable internally displaced persons to make a free and informed
choice on whether to return, integrate locally or relocate by
consulting with them on these and other options and ensuring their
participation in finding a sustainable solution." 418 However, even
this formulation falls short of a full and explicit recognition of the
right to return home from internal displacement.
The right to property upon return is by far the most contentious
subject. Under international human rights law, the right to property
is always subject to certain public interest restrictions. 419 It may not,
however, be arbitrarily deprived. 420 When IDPs return home, the

413.
Geneva Convention IV, supra note 14, art. 49; KALIN, supra note 8, at 69.
414.
See supra note 412 and accompanying text (noting that the right to return
is framed in the context of evacuees being transferred back to their homes at the end of
hostilities). The right to return under international human rights law is a subject of
some discussion. For a commentary examining the right to return by persons displaced
from New Orleans as a result of Hurricane Katrina, see Lolita Buckner Innis, A
Domestic Right to Return? Race, Rights, and Residency in New Orleans in the
Aftermath of HurricaneKatrina, 27 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 325, 364-71 (2007).
415.
Guiding Principles, supra note 8, princ. 28.
416.
AU Convention, supra note 9, art. 11(1).
Guiding Principles, supra note 8, princ. 28(2).
417.
AU Convention, supra note 9, art. 11(2).
418.
419.
See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 13, art. 17 (stating that "[elveryone has the
right to own property" and that "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property").
420.
See, e.g., id. art. 17(2) ("No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
property.").
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most serious problem they face is the loss or destruction of their
property. 4 21 It may not always be possible to determine the party
responsible for the loss or destruction. The UN Guiding Principles do
not properly confront these issues. The only paragraph dedicated to
the issue of recovery and reparations reads: "Competent authorities
have the duty and responsibility to assist returned and/or resettled
internally displaced persons to recover, to the extent possible, their
property and possessions which they left behind or were disposed of
upon their displacement." 422 With respect to compensation or
reparation, the same paragraph requires that "[w]hen recovery of
such property and possessions is not possible, competent authorities
shall provide or assist these persons in obtaining appropriate
compensation or another form of just reparation." 423
The AU Convention dedicates more elaborate provisions for the
issues of recovery, compensation, and reparations. The provisions
envision at least five distinct scenarios: (1) the property is available
but ownership is disputed; 424 (2) the property is land and it is
dispossessed; 425 (3) the property is not identified, but there is a
general economic loss associated with the displacement; 426 (4) the
property is identified but had been lost or damaged;4 27 and (5) the
property is not identified but there is a general economic loss
associated with displacement caused by natural disaster. 428
In the first scenario, the obligations of the state are limited to
establishing "appropriate mechanisms providing for simplified
procedures, where necessary, for resolving disputes relating to the
property." 429 These simplified procedures are presumably subject to
due process considerations under international human rights law. 430
The second scenario addresses circumstances where displaced
communities with dependency and attachment to land have been
dispossessed of their land. This may include indigenous people. The
AU Convention does not provide a categorical statement that the land
shall be returned to them, but it contains a permissive provision:

421.

See generally Walter Kilin, Internal Displacement and the Protection of

Property, 1 Swiss HUM. RTS. BOOK 175 (2006) (analyzing the risk of property left
behind by IDPs and refugees and their inability to recover it).
Guiding Principles, supra note 8, princ. 29(2).
422.
423.
Id. The Guiding Principles state the right to property more clearly under
Principle 21, but the recovery and reparations provisions under Principal 29 are more
restrictive.
AU Convention, supra note 9, art. 11(4).
424.
425.
Id. art. 11(5).
426.
Id. art. 12(1).
427.
Id. art. 12(2).
428.
Id. art. 12(3).
Id. art. 11(4).
429.
ICCPR, supra note 13, arts. 9, 14, 15.
430.
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"States Parties shall make all appropriate measures, whenever
possible, to restore the lands of communities with special dependency
and attachment to such lands upon the communities' return,
reintegration, and reinsertion." 431
The third scenario is perhaps the most common. Displacement
almost always causes economic loss, which is often difficult to
assess.4 3 2 The AU Convention does not directly recognize a right to
be compensated for these kinds of general economic loss, but it states
in ambiguous terms that the "States Parties shall provide persons
affected by displacement with effective remedies." 43 3 The nature of
these remedies is not clarified anywhere.
The fourth scenario identifies what may be the second most
likely occurrence: the damage of property in situations where there is
little or no possibility that the party responsible for the damage could
be held responsible. In those circumstances, the AU Convention
obligates states to "establish an effective legal framework to provide
just and fair compensation and other forms of reparations, where
appropriate,to internally displaced persons for damage incurred as a
result of displacement, in accordance with international
standards." 434 Although the words "where appropriate" add an
element of discretion, at least the formulation of the reparations
prong seems better than the UN Guiding Principles' formulation, in
which the obligation of the state is limited to providing or assisting
the IDPs with obtaining compensation.4 35
The fifth scenario is very specific, not only as to the cause of the
loss or damage, but also as to the fault of the party responsible. It
envisages a situation whereby natural disaster is responsible for the
displacement, but the state failed to provide the appropriate
protection and assistance: "A State Party shall be liable to make
reparation to internally displaced persons for damage when such a
State Party refrains from protecting and assisting internally
displaced persons in the event of natural disaster."436 Since this is
essentially a fault-based remedy, this provision may be invoked for
material as well as moral damages. 437

431.
AU Convention, supranote 9, art. 11(5) (emphasis added).
See generally GUIDANCE ON PROFILING INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS
432.
(IDMC & UN Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs eds. 2008), ochaonline.un.org/

OchaLinkClick.aspx?link=ocha&docId=1092270 (highlighting the difficult process by
which data on IDPs is collected and the issues that arise in the process).
433.
434.
435.
436.

AU Convention, supra note 9, art. 12(1).
Id. art. 12(2) (emphasis added).
Guiding Principles, supra note 8, princ. 29(2).
Id. art. 12(3).

437.

The issue of compensation or reparations is not entirely unprecedented. In

the Miskito case, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has recommended
the payment of appropriatecompensation for returning IDPs. Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report
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G. Rights and Responsibilitiesof Non-State Actors
One of the unique characteristics of the AU Convention is its
assignment of rights and responsibilities to international
or
(NGOs)
organizations
nongovernmental
organizations,
Before the AU
humanitarian agencies, and armed groups.
Convention's provisions are examined, it is important to look at the
UN Guiding Principles, which provide the basis for the Convention's
approach to this issue.
The UN Guiding Principles define the rights and responsibilities
of international organizations and NGOs in the context of
humanitarian assistance and emphasize the right of access. 4 38
Perhaps the most important principle states that "[i]nternational
humanitarian organizations and other appropriate actors have the
right to offer their services in support of the internally displaced."4 39
It further provides that "such an offer shall not be regarded as an
unfriendly act or interference in a State's internal affairs and shall be
construed in good faith." 440 And, most importantly, it emphasizes
that "consent thereto shall not be arbitrarily withheld, particularly
when authorities concerned are unable or unwilling to provide the
required humanitarian assistance." 44 1 The UN Guiding Principles
emphasize the same principle in the context of return and
reintegration by stating that "[a]ll authorities concerned shall grant
on the Situation of Human Rights of a Segment of the Nicaraguan Population of
Miskito Origin and Resolution on the Friendly Settlement Procedure Regarding the
Human Rights Situation of a Segment of the NicaraguanPopulationof Miskito Origin,
OEAlser. LIV/II.62, doc. 10 rev. 3 (1983), OEA/ser. L/V/II.62, doc. 26 (1984). There are
numerous other examples of reparations, particularly when the loss of property is a
result of human rights violations. See, e.g., Kurt v Turkey, App. No. 24276/94, 27 Eur.
Comm'n H.R. Rep. 373 (1998) (awarding compensation for loss of property to surviving
relatives). Most importantly, the World Bank requires that states receiving World
Bank funds compensate persons displaced as a result of development projects.

Involuntary Resettlement, supranote 140.
438.

See Guiding Principles, supra note 8, princs. 24-27, 30.

All humanitarian assistance shall be carried out in accordance with the
without
and
impartiality
and
of
humanity
principles
discrimination... . International humanitarian organizations and other
appropriate actors have the right to offer their services in support of the
internally displaced.. . . Persons engaged in humanitarian assistance, their
transport and supplies shall be respected and protected. . . . International
international
respect relevant
organizations . . . should
humanitarian
standards and codes of conduct.. . . All authorities concerned shall grant and
facilitate ... rapid and unimpeded access to internally displaced persons to
assist in their return or resettlement and reintegration.

Id.
439.
440.
441.

Id. princ. 25.
Id.
Id.
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and facilitate for international humanitarian organizations and other
appropriate actors, in the exercise of their respective mandate, rapid
and unimpeded access to internally displaced persons to assist in
their return and reintegration." 442
In addition, the UN Guiding Principles state that non-state
actors must carry out their duties "in accordance with the principles
of humanity and impartiality and without discrimination."44 3 They
are also required to respect "relevant international standards and
codes of conduct." 444
With a view to incorporating and readopting some of these
principles, the AU Convention contains several provisions that
correspond to the rights and responsibilities of different categories of
non-state
actors, mainly international
organizations
and
humanitarian agencies, the African Union, and armed groups. 4 45
1.

International Organizations and Humanitarian Agencies

Unlike the UN Guiding Principles, which emphasize the rights of
international humanitarian organizations to have access to IDPs, the
AU Convention clearly emphasizes the obligations of these
organizations rather than their rights.446
Although the AU
Convention dedicates no independent provision to the rights of these
organizations, it does create an independent provision for their
obligations. 447
The obligations are stated in clear terms:
"International organizations and humanitarian agencies shall
discharge their obligations under this Convention in conformity with
international law and the laws of the country in which they
operate."4 48 Consistent with the UN Guiding Principles, the same
provision requires these organizations to respect the rights of the
IDPs and also adhere to the principles of neutrality, impartiality, and
independence. 44 9
The rights of these organizations are recognized in scattered
provisions of the AU Convention, but consistent with the other

442.
Id. princ. 30.
443.
Id. princ. 24(1).
444.
Id. princ. 27(1).
445.
AU Convention, supra note 9, art 6. Apart from these non-state actors, the
Convention obligates states parties to "[e]nsure the accountability of non-State
actors .. . including multinational companies and private military or security
companies, for acts of arbitrary displacement or complicity in such acts." Id. art.
3(1)(h).
446.
Id. art. 6 (outlining the obligations relating to international organizations
and humanitarian agencies); Guiding Principles, supra note 8, princ. 25.
AU Convention, supra note 9, art. 6.
447.
448.
Id. art. 6(1).
449.
Id. art. 6(2)-(3).
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provisions, these rights are formulated from the perspective of the
obligations of states. The AU Convention first states that the
primary responsibility of providing protection and assistance to IDPs
rests on the state, but the state may seek assistance from other states
and from international organizations. 450 Additionally, it requires
that "States Parties shall respect the mandate of the AU and the UN,
as well as the role of international humanitarian organizations in
providing protection and assistance to internally displaced persons, in
accordance with international law."451
The AU Convention does not give such organizations and
agencies a new mandate, but it recognizes their existing mandates.
Examples of existing mandates may include the mandate given to the
UNHCR by the UN General Assembly4 52 and the mandate given to
the International Committee of the Red Cross by the Geneva
Conventions. 45 3 Perhaps most importantly, the AU Convention
obligates states to provide a "rapid and unimpeded passage of all
relief consignments, equipment and personnel," subject only to
"technical arrangements" under which the state may permit such
access. 45 4 The permissible scope of these "technical arrangements" is
unclear, especially because of the lack of a provision that directly
recognizes the rights of the organizations to have unimpeded access,
which the UN Guiding Principles clearly recognize. 45 5
Although the AU Convention does not redefine the mandates of
the UN and other international organizations and agencies, it
dedicates an entire provision to the definition of the mandate of the
AU, as discussed in the following section.

Id. art. 5(1)-(2).
450.
Id. art. 5(3). It further provides that if the state is unable to provide
451.
protection and assistance, the state must seek help from international organizations
and humanitarian agencies and that such organizations and agencies "may offer
services to all those in need." Id. art. 5(6).
Exec. Comm. of High Commissioner's Programme, UNHCR's Role in
452.
Support of Enhanced Humanitarian Response to Situations of Internal Displacement:
Policy Framework and Implementation Strategy, U.N. Doc. EC/58/SC/CRP.18 (June 4,
2007), http://www.unhcr.org/46641fff2.html (providing a comprehensive review of how
the UNHCR is implementing a policy to address the issue of IDPs).
ICRC, Internally Displaced Persons: The Mandate and Role of the
453.
International Committee of the Red Cross, INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS, No. 838
(2000), http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/miscJ57jqhr.htm.
AU Convention, supra note 9, art. 5(7).
454.
See Guiding Principles, supra note 8, princ. 25 (ensuring right of
455.
international humanitarian organizations to offer their services in support of the
internally displaced).
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African Union

Article 8 of the AU Convention is fully dedicated to the AU's
rights and obligations. It begins by restating the basic principle
contained in the Constitutive Act: "The African Union shall have the
right to intervene

in a Member State . . . in respect of grave

circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide, and crimes against
humanity."456 Presumably, if these kinds of atrocities affect IDPs,
the AU can invoke this particular provision in addition to the
provision of the Constitutive Act that allows such intervention.4 5 7
The AU Convention does not include any other provisions that
grant the AU rights. Interestingly, however, it includes several
provisions that obligate the AU to take some concrete, affirmative
steps.
For example, the AU Convention obligates the AU to
strengthen its own institutional framework and capacity for the
benefit of IDPs, to coordinate and mobilize resources, to cooperate
with affected states, to share information with the concerned human
rights organs, and to cooperate with other agencies in addressing the
problem of internal displacement. 458
It is important to note that these provisions purport to impose
some specific affirmative duties on an entity that is not a state, and
that is therefore not a party to the AU Convention. They are thus
different from the other provisions that affect international
organizations or humanitarian agencies because those provisions are
framed in the context of the obligations of the states. For example,
the most notable of these provisions reads: "States Parties shall
respect the mandates of the African Union and the United
Nations . .

. ,"

not that these organizations "shall" perform such and

such duties.4 59 It is not clear why the drafters included provisions
that directly obligate the AU when it is not a party to the agreement.
It is also unclear how this provision may be enforced. At the most
basic level, however, it is clear that the contracting parties envisioned
a situation whereby the AU takes a leading and proactive role in
coordinating humanitarian efforts in cases of large-scale
displacement. 460
456.
Compare AU Convention, supra note 9, art. 8(1), with Constitutive Act of
the African Union, art. 4(h), July 11, 2000, 2158 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AU
Constitutive Act] (stating "the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State
pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war
crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity").
AU Constitutive Act, supra note 456, art. 4(h).
457.
AU Convention, supra note 9, art. 8(3)(a)-(f).
458.
459.
Id. art. 5(3).
460.
See id. art. 8(3)(a)-(f) ("The African Union shall ... [s]trengthen the
institutional framework and capacity of the African Union with respect to protection
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Armed Groups

The AU Convention defines "Armed Groups" as "dissident armed
forces or other organized armed groups that are distinct from the
armed forces of the state."4 61 Although it makes reference to armed
groups in many sections, 46 2 it does not directly prescribe conduct or
omission on their part. In fact, the AU Convention, in at least two
provisions, provides that the fact that armed groups are referenced
must not be interpreted as giving them any recognition. 463
Concerned with the possibility of a party interpreting the
Convention as recognizing these groups, the provision that directly
addresses armed groups does so in the context of criminal
responsibility: "Members of Armed Groups shall be held criminally
responsible for their acts which violate the rights of internally
displaced persons under international and national laws." 464
Presumably, this suggests the corresponding duty of the state to hold
armed groups accountable for their actions.
In other provisions, the AU Convention obligates the states to
"prohibit" armed groups from engaging in arbitrary displacement,
hampering protection and assistance, disturbing safety, restricting
freedom of movement, recruiting children and others into their
military forces, attacking them, or otherwise violating their rights. 465
Although the nature of the immediate action commanded by the term
"prohibit" is not clear, it is fair to assume that the Convention
envisions contracting states proscribing these actions in their laws
and punishing the abridgement of those laws. Although the repeated
disclaimer on recognition makes it seem as though the Convention
prescribes certain rules of conduct for armed groups, all of the
provisions that reference them obligate the contracting states to hold
them responsible. 4 66

and assistance to internally displaced persons[, and] [c]oordinate the mobilization of
resources for protection and assistance to internally displaced persons.. .
Id. art. 1(e).
461.
462.
E.g., id. arts. 1(e), (n), 2(e), 5(11), 4(5), 7(1), 9(2)(g), 15(2).
463.
See id. art. 7(2) ("Nothing in this Convention shall be invoked for the
purpose of affecting the sovereignty of a State or the responsibility of the Government,
by all legitimate means, to maintain or re-establish law and order in the State or to
defend the national unity and territorial integrity of the State."); id. art. 15(2) ("State
Parties agree that nothing in this Convention shall be construed as affording legal
status or legitimizing armed groups and that its provisions are without prejudice to the
individual criminal responsibility of their members under domestic or international
criminal law.").
Id. art. 7(4).
464.
Id. art. 7(5)(a)-(i).
465.
See id. arts. 7(4)-(5), 15(2) (stipulating that armed groups will be criminally
466.
responsible for their acts, outlining prohibitions on armed groups, and noting that the
Convention does not afford legal status to or legitimize armed groups).
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H. Enforcement
These are wonderful principles, but how can they be enforced?
The UN Guiding Principles do not purport to be binding on their own,
and they are considered to be restatements of existing international
norms. 4 67 As such, their implementation is admittedly left to the
concerned actors. 468 To the extent that the UN Guiding Principles
are expressions of existing norms, domestic remedies may be invoked
where they are available. If the domestic laws and the available
remedies are not sufficient or are inconsistent with the UN Guiding
Principles, there is no additional or peculiar enforcement option
except to resort to the relevant UN 469 or regional human rightsenforcement mechanisms on a case-by-case basis. 470 For example, in
at least two cases in the Inter-American Human Rights system, the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights used the UN Guiding
Principles as tools for the interpretation of the "right to movement"
provision of the Inter-American Human Rights Convention. 47 1
A brief discussion of one of these cases provides a good context
for the challenges of enforcement of the AU Convention. Before this
case is discussed, however, it is important to note that the Inter467.
See Guiding Principles, supra note 8, Intro. 1 10 ("The Principles are
intended to provide guidance to the Representative in carrying out his mandate; to
States when faced with the phenomenon of displacement; to all other authorities,
groups and persons in their relations with internally displaced persons; and to
intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations when addressing internal
displacement." (emphasis added)).
See id. (identifying the rules as permissive, not mandatory, thus leaving
468.
enforcement to those actors materially affected by incorporated norms).
The UN's human rights enforcement mechanisms, unlike its humanitarian
469.
and development mechanisms, are admittedly very weak. In fact, they are deliberately
kept that way because of the members' sensitivities about their own human rights
records. See COHEN & DENG, supra note 337, at 280-81 (noting a lack of self-interest to
create the political will necessary to address such human rights problems).
470.
On a practical level, several states have already enacted legislation
incorporating the Guiding Principles into their domestic laws, including the creation of
some national institutions. See generally, Walter Kiain, The Future of the Guiding
Principles on Internal Displacement, FORCED MIGRATION REV., Dec. 2006, at 5
(describing some of the national-level efforts); Jessica Wyndham, A Developing Trend:
Laws and Policies on Internal Displacement, 14 HuM. RTS. BRIEF 7 (2006) (briefly
describing the developing trend in domesticating the Guiding Principles). For a more
thorough treatment of the challenges of domestic application of the Guiding Principles
from various perspectives, see INCORPORATING THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON INTERNAL
DISPLACEMENT INTO DOMESTIC LAW: ISSUES AND CHALLENGES (Walter Kalin et al. eds.,
2010).
See Moiwana Community v. Suriname, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
471.
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 145, %1 104-21 (Feb. 8, 2006) (relying on the
guidelines to "illuminate the reach and content of Article 22 of the Convention");
Mapiripdn Massacre v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 134, T 37 (Sept. 15, 2005) (relying on the Guiding Principles
to "define the content and scope of Article 22 of the Convention").

74

VANDERBILT/OURNL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 44:1

American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) has jurisdiction to
adjudicate claims of human rights violations under the American
Convention on Human Rights (ACHR).472 Procedurally, cases may
only be referred to the court by a state party or the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, 4 73 which is sometimes referred to as
the gatekeeper. 4 74 Although an individual person or group of persons
may file a petition with the Commission claiming violations of the
ACHR, 4 75 only the Commission may refer a case to the court. 476 In
addition to other conventional remedies, the court may award fair
compensation to victims of human rights violations. 477 The court's
judgments are required to be executed just like the judgments of the
domestic courts of the contracting parties.4 78
To some extent, this Inter-American system corresponds with the
European system of human rights.4 79 However, with Protocol 11 of
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, 4 80 the European system took the next
natural step by allowing individuals to file cases directly with the
European Court of Human Rights without the need for the
involvement of the European Human Rights Commission. 481

American Convention on Human Rights, arts. 52-69, July 18, 1978, 144
472.
U.N.T.S. 123, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36 [hereinafter ACHRI. For the details of the procedures
involved, see generally J.M. PAsQUALICCI, THE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE
INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2003).

ACHR, supranote 472, art. 61.
473.
See e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, Import, Export, and Regional Consent in the
474.
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 101, 103 (2008) (explaining
that the ACHR requires contentious cases be processed by the Commission).
ACHR, supra note 472, art. 44.
475.
See id. arts. 48-51, 61 (outlining the procedures the Commission must
476.
follow before a case can be presented to the court and obligating all cases to be put
through the Commission's procedures); see also Neuman, supra note 474, at 103
(describing the Commission's retained power to refuse to allow a case to be heard by
the court).
ACHR, supra note 472, art. 63.
477.
Id. art. 68.
478.
See Neuman, supra note 474, at 102-03 ("[T]he drafters of the ACHR
479.
substantially modeled the Court and its relationship with the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights on the structure of the European human rights
system .... ).
Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
480.
Fundamental Freedoms, Restructuring the Control Machinery Established Thereby,
Oct. 9, 1993, Europ. T.S. No. 155. It is important to note, however, that even in the
Inter-American system, although individuals cannot be parties to the litigation that
the Commission prosecutes before the court, the individual victims may continue to
participate in the proceedings. For a good discussion of the jurisdiction of the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, see Thomas Buergenthal, The Inter-American Court
of Human Rights, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 231, 245 (1982) (concluding that the court's ability
to discharge its mission will depend heavily on how the Commission utilizes it).
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
481.
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 34, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. 5.
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In Case of "Mapiripdn Massacre" v. Colombia, the IACHR
interpreted Article 22 of the ACHR, which guarantees freedom of
The
movement, to include the right not to be displaced.48 2
controversy that led the Inter-American Human Rights Commission
to file this case involved allegations of torture and the murder of
approximately forty-nine Colombians by armed groups with
government complicity, as well as the forcible displacement of
The court found that the state of Colombia was
survivors. 48 3
responsible for the killings and the displacement of at least some of
the victims. 484 Most importantly, the court awarded the victims of
internal displacement pecuniary damages ranging from $5,000 to
$20,000.485
As a binding regional human rights instrument, the AU
Convention's enforcement must be considered within the context of
the African human rights enforcement regime. Unlike the European
and Inter-American human rights regimes, the African human rights
enforcement regime was an afterthought, and it has undergone
significant evolution since the time of the creation of the Organization
of African Unity (OAU), the precursor of the AU. In the early 1960s,
the protection of human rights was not as preeminent as the
principles of sovereignty and noninterference because the OAU's
principal mission was to promote and safeguard independence. 4 86 In
1981, the OAU adopted the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights (ACHPR).4 87 The Charter established the African Human
Rights Commission (AHC) to "promote human and peoples' rights and
ensure their protection in Africa." 4 88 Not being a judicial organ with
authority to receive individual complaints, the Commission remained
a subject of severe criticism.48 9 Serious efforts to create a judicial
organ led, in 1998, to the adoption of the Protocol to the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an

482.
Mapiripin Massacre v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 134, $$ 170-171 (Sept. 15, 2005).
MapiripdnMassacre, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 134, at 1 2.
483.
484.
Id.
189.
485.
Id. 1 256-74.
See, e.g., Nsongurua J. Udombana, An African Human Rights Court and an
486.
African Union Court: A Needful Duality or a Needless Duplicity?, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
811, 819 (2003) ("This sovereignty principle, together with the non-interference
principle-the reserve domain-became the identity symbol of the [OAU].").
ACHPR, supra note 412. For an assessment of the Charter, see, e.g., U.O.
487.
Umozuike, The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 77 AM. J. INTL L. 902,
907 (1983) ("The Charter breaks new ground by including individual duties in an
international instrument.").
ACHPR, supranote 412, art. 30.
488.
See, e.g., Nsongurua J. Udombana, Toward the African Court on Human
489.
and Peoples'Rights:Better Late than Never, 3 YALE HUM. RTS & DEv. L.J. 45, 64 (2000)
(calling the Commission "a toothless bulldog").
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African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (Human Rights Court
Protocol). 490 As concerns over gaining and maintaining political
independence began to overcome economic concerns, the push to
create an organization with a renewed mission gained momentum
and culminated, in 2001, with the creation of the AU as a political,
social, and economic organization. 49 1 The Human Rights Court
Protocol entered into force in January 2004, three years after the
AU's creation. 492
The status of the Human Rights Court was initially unclear
because the AU Constitutive Act provided for the creation of a judicial
organ called the African Court of Justice (ACJ).493 To clarify this
confusion and streamline the working of the judicial organs, the
Assembly of Heads of State and Government decided to merge the
ACJ with the ACHPR and create the African Court of Justice and
Human Rights. 494 In July 2008, the African Union Summit adopted
the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and
Human Rights (ACJHR), creating a unified court system for the
adjudication of all cases, including human rights claims. 495 It could
be concluded that by the time the AU Convention is in force and
ready for enforcement, the ACJHR will be the principal judicial
organ. Therefore, the enforcement of the AU Convention must be
looked at in the context of the ACJHR.
1.

Non-Judicial Enforcement
The AU Convention

establishes

"a Conference

of States

Parties . . . to monitor and review the implementation of the objectives

of this Convention." 496 The AU Convention does not properly define
the mandate of the "Conference," except by noting that it shall

490.
See Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 10, 1998, OAU
Doc. OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III) (entered into force on Jan. 25, 2004)
[hereinafter Human Rights Court Protocol], http://www.africa-union.org/rootlaul
Documents/Treaties/Text/africancourt-humanrights.pdf.
491.
AU Constitutive Act, supra note 456, art 4.
See supra note 490 (listing the date the Human Rights Court Protocol went
492.
into force).
493.
AU Constitutive Act, supra note 456, art. 18(a).
494.
See Int'l Ctr. for the Protection of Human Rights, African Union Adopts the
Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights,
INTERRIGHTS.ORG, http://www.interights.org/AfricanSingleProtocolAdoptedlindex.htm
(last visited Jan. 5, 2011) (announcing the intended merger of the ACHPR and the
ACJ).
495.
Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights,
July 1, 2008 [hereinafter ACJHR Protocol], http://www.africa-union.org/rootlaul
Documents/Treaties/text/Protocol%20on%20the%20Merged%2OCourt%20-%20EN.pdf.
496.
AU Convention, supra note 9, art. 14(1) (emphasis added).
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monitor the implementation of the objectives, not necessarily the
terms or provisions of the Convention. The objectives of the AU
Convention are set forth under Article 2 and include both the
establishment of a legal framework for the prevention of internal
displacement and the protection and assistance of displaced persons
Viewed in this light, the
when displacement occurs. 497
implementation of the objectives could mean the implementation of
not only the spirit but also the letter of the provisions of the AU
However, the AU Convention does not give any
Convention.
meaningful guidance as to how the Conference of States may carry
out its mission of monitoring compliance. The other subsections of
the same provision suggest that the drafters have envisioned a
situation where the contracting states consult with the Conference of
States prior to reporting their legislative and other actions to the AU
under Article 62 of the African Charter. 498
The contracting states obviously did not want to create a robust
enforcement mechanism. Although they could have created an
independent and specialized agency with a special mandate of
monitoring implementation and compliance, they chose not to do so.
Some of the concerns that prevented the creation of a new UN agency
for IDPs may have contributed to the decision. These concerns have
both a practical and theoretical dimension. The practical fears
include duplicating existing capacities, raising costs, and encouraging
dependency. 499 The theoretical concern is perhaps more relevant,
and it returns to the issue of sovereignty. IDPs, by definition, are
within the jurisdiction of their own states,50 0 and states are often
wary of assigning a legal mandate to an international agency to
intervene in their domestic affairs. As Roberta Cohen and Francis
Deng note, utilizing existing agencies such as the UNHCR is more
effective; they can involve themselves in the protection of IDPs

497.
Id. art. 2(a)-(e).
See id. art. 14(4) (imposing an obligation on states parties to indicate
498.
legislative measures taken to give effect to the Convention when they present reports
under Article 62 of the ACHPR); ACHPR, supra note 412, art. 62.
COHEN & DENG, supra note 337, at 168-69.
499.
See AU Convention, supra note 9, art. 1(k).
500.
"Internally Displaced Persons" means persons or groups of persons who have
been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual
residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed
conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or
natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally
recognized State border.
Id.
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"without drawing too much attention" because they are already there
for a different purpose.5 01
Although this concern over sovereignty is understandable, an
independent agency could be established with a limited mandate to
monitor the implementation of provisions of the AU Convention and
coordinate the humanitarian efforts of existing international
organizations and other humanitarian agencies. The creation of this
kind of agency would be appropriate despite sovereignty concerns,
because a binding agreement without an effective enforcement
mechanism is ultimately inconsequential. 502 It is important to note,
however, that the mandate given to the Conference of States could be
broadly interpreted to allow the Conference to delegate its power to
an agency for monitoring implementation, including assisting IDPs in
seeking an international judicial remedy within the context of the
regional human rights enforcement mechanism. 50 3 This leads to the
discussion of the judicial enforcement mechanism that the AU
Convention envisions.
2.

Judicial Enforcement

The AU Convention contains a distinct provision for the
settlement of disputes: "Any dispute or difference arising between the
States Parties with regard to the interpretation or application of this
Convention shall be settled amicably through direct consultations
between Parties concerned." 504 In addition, "[i]n the event of failure
to settle the dispute or differences, either State may refer the dispute
to the African Court of Justice and Human Rights."50 5 Although the
"settlement of disputes" provision is limited to disputes between
contracting states, non-state actors may also be parties to a dispute
for the enforcement of the Convention, as explored below.
i.

State v. State

The dispute settlement provision properly covers the possibility
of a state-to-state dispute. Although these disputes would fall within

501.
Id. at 169.
502.
See supra note 469 and accompanying text (noting the frustrations of
enforcing an agreement purposefully weakened by the trepidations of participating
states).
503.
See AU Convention, supra note 9, art. 14(a) ("States Parties agree to
establish a Conference of States Parties to this Convention to monitor and review the
implementation of the objectives of this Convention.").
Id. art. 22(1).
504.
505.
Id. Subsection (2) gives the Conference of States authority to resolve
disputes by a two-thirds majority vote of those states present and voting until the
ACJHR is established. Id. art. 22(2).
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the jurisdiction of the ACJHR even without this provision, 506 it
expressly gives the ACJHR jurisdiction to adjudicate claims of one
state against another on the interpretation and application of the AU
Convention.50 7
Given the nature of the AU Convention, however, it is difficult to
imagine circumstances that would compel a state party to institute
an action against another. The AU Convention recognizes that each
state party has the primary responsibility to protect and assist
IDPs, 5 08 and it obligates states to seek assistance when they are
incapable of doing SO.509 Therefore, disputes are most likely to arise
from the disregard of these duties.
Theoretically, any of the
contracting parties may bring an action against the defaulting state
seeking compliance.5 10 However, such a claim would need to be
framed as "state A broke its promise to state B by not protecting or
assisting its own citizens." Although theoretically possible, this type
of claim would be unusual.5 1 ' The following subsection explores some
of the more probable cases.
ii.

Non-State Actor v. State

The AU Convention itself does not contain any provisions
regarding the possibility of non-state actors bringing actions before
the ACJHR. However, the Statute of the ACJHR allows some nonstate actors to institute actions. 512 These non-state actors include the
Assembly of the African Union, the Parliament and other organs
authorized by the Assembly, the African Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights, accredited African intergovernmental organizations,

506.
See Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, art. 28(b),
July 1, 2008, 48 I.L.M. 317 (2008) [hereinafter ACJHR Statute] (granting jurisdiction
to the court to interpret all treaties made under the auspices of the AU).
507.
AU Convention, supra note 9, art. 22(1).
508.
Id. art. 5(4).
509.
Id. art. 6.
510.
See id. art. 22(1) (granting the right to either state party involved in a
dispute to refer the case to the ACJHR).
511.
The enforcement of refugee law faces a similar practical difficulty. If, for
example, a state violates its non-refoulement obligation and sends a refugee back to
her country, the country of origin that receives the refugee back is not likely to sue the
sending state for violating its international treaty obligations because that state will
naturally be pleased to get that refugee back. For some discussion of this difficulty, see
Won Kidane, An Injury to the Citizen, a Pleasureto the State: PeculiarChallenges to the
Enforcement of InternationalRefugee Law, 6 CHI.-KENT J. INT'L & COMP. L. 116, 11617 (2006) ("If [a] refugee is injured in a country where he sought refuge, then the
country of origin that would have sought redress under normal diplomatic and consular
situations certainly would be unwilling or even might be pleased to see such injury
occur.").
512.
ACJHR Statute, supra note 506, arts. 29-30.
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and African national human rights institutions.5 1 3 To the extent they
meet all other requirements for establishing a cause of action, these
entities' access to the Court is unrestricted. 514 Nonetheless, NGOs
and individuals, the two non-state actors who are most likely to seek
a remedy from the ACJHR, do not have direct and unlimited access:
under the Statute of the ACJHR, states have the option to grant or
deny access to NGOs and individuals.5 15 A state that wishes to allow
access must expressly do so at the time of ratification or accession. 5 16
Any number of allegations of violations could give rise to
controversies needing adjudication by the ACJHR. For example, a
group of IDPs could claim arbitrary displacement in violation of
Article 4(4) of the Convention5 1 7 or failure to mandate environmental
impact assessment in the case of large-scale development projects
under Article 10(3).518 If the state denies these allegations, the
ability of the IDPs to seek a judicial remedy from the ACJHR depends
on whether the particular state decided to grant access to individuals
or NGOs. 519 If the state made that choice, IDPs, on their own or
represented by NGOs, could bring an action under Article 30(f) of the
Statute of the Court. 520
If the respondent state opts not to recognize the Court's
jurisdiction to accept individual or NGO petitions, the claimants
would have to explore a more indirect and uncertain path to access
the Court. The most natural indirect access they could seek would be
through the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights,
which has direct access to the Court. 521 However, the Commission
must exhaust all other procedures within its mandate before it can
bring an action before the ACJHR. 522 Although the Commission's
procedures for handling complaints and addressing violations are

513.
Id.
Id.
514.
515.
Id. art. 30(f); ACJHR Protocol, supra note 495, art. 8(3).
516.
See supra note 515. These two provisions refer to each other and permit a
state to acquiesce to the jurisdiction of the court for NGOs and individuals.
517.
See AU Convention, supra note 9, art. 4(4) ("All persons have a right to be
protected against arbitrary displacement.").
518.
See id. art. 10(3) ("States parties shall carry out a socio-economic and
environmental impact assessment of a proposed development project prior to
undertaking such a project.").
519.
See infra notes 520-21 and accompanying text (listing relevant treaty
provisions).
520.
See ACJHR Statute, supra note 506, art. 30(f) (listing individuals or NGOs
accredited by the AU as eligible to bring an action in the court subject to certain
conditions). This assumes that they have exhausted all domestic remedies.
521.
Id. art. 30(b).
522.
See ACHPR, supra note 412, arts. 45-59 (detailing the procedure a state
party to the treaty and the Commission must go through when there is a potential
violation of the Charter).
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lengthy and even frustrating, it is an option aggrieved IDPs could
explore.5 23
Another possibility, admittedly theoretical, is for the Conference
of States to present a claim on behalf of the IDPs. One of the entities
to which the Statute of the ACJHR grants unconditional access is
"African Intergovernmental Organizations accredited by the Union or
its Organs." 524 The Conference of States Parties, established by the
AU Convention to monitor compliance, could qualify as an
intergovernmental organization so long as it gets the required
accreditation.5 2 5 In fact, for the AU Convention to be meaningfully
implemented, this entity's access to the Court seems essential.
Whether the claim is presented by individuals, NGOs, the
Commission, or the Conference of States Parties, if the IDPs prevail,
the Court has the jurisdiction to order a variety of remedies,
including compensation for violations of rights. 526 Although the
judgment of the Court is final and binding, 527 execution of the
judgment against an unwilling state could be a long process. Under
the Court's Statute, if a state refuses to execute the Court's judgment,
the "Court shall refer the matter to the Assembly" of the AU. 528 The
Assembly would then decide on what measures it must take to ensure
execution of the Court's judgment.5 29 These measures may include
sanctions under Article 23(2) of the Constitutive Act of the AU. 530

The Commission is required to comply with all the reporting and other
523.
procedures set forth under Articles 45-59 of the Charter before it can bring an action.
This is admittedly a very long and frustrating process. It is important to note, however,
that the Commission does have a Special Rapporteur for Refugees, Asylum Seekers,
Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons who could seek a remedy short of judicial
remedy. For the mandate and works of the existing Rapporteur, see Special Rapporteur
on Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa,
AFR. COMM'N ON HUM. AND PEOPLE'S RTs., http://www.achpr.org/englishlinfo/index
rdp..en.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2011).
ACJHR Statute, supra note 506, art. 30(d).
524.
525.
Such entities must be authorized by Article 30, but no formal criteria for
accreditation exists.
ACJHR Statute, supra note 506, art. 45.
526.
527.
Id. art. 46(1).
528.
Id. art. 46(4).
Id.
529.
530.
Id. art. 46(5).
Furthermore, any Member State that fails to comply with the decisions and
policies of the Union may be subjected to other sanctions, such as the denial of
transport and communications links with other Member States, and other
measures of a political and economic nature to be determined by the Assembly.
AU Constitutive Act, supra note 456, art. 23(2).

82

VANDERBILTJOURNAL

OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 44:1

V. CONCLUSION

This Article analyzed several important issues raised by the
AU's novel IDPs Convention. Based on the above in-depth analysis of
the issues, it offers the following conclusions.
(1) The unique and bold measure of hardening what was
deliberately left as soft law by the international
community is duly justified because the nature and
magnitude of the forced migration of persons in Africa is a
product of its troubled history.
(2) The new legal status that the AU Convention assigns to a
group of persons called IDPs is doctrinally viable and
consistent with Africa's long-standing emphasis on
collective rights as well as the steady, albeit cautious,
movement towards recognition of more rights and
adoption of more contemporary notions of sovereignty.
(3) Humanitarian considerations of deservingness are fact
specific. Categorically, IDPs cannot be said to be less
deserving than refugees. Some IDPs may be more
deserving of protection and assistance than some
refugees, and vice versa. Moreover, sovereignty as a
barrier to international protection and assistance
functions in exactly the same way in the case of IDPs and
refugees. After all, refugees are persons who move from
There is nothing
one sovereign nation to another.
inherent in the crossing of an international boundary that
guarantees international protection. In fact, the refugeereceiving sovereign may have more excuses to
discriminate against and violate rights of refugees on the
basis of their alien siatus. Therefore, considerations of
deservingness and sovereignty cannot undermine the
validity of a legally recognized IDP category.
(4) The AU Convention does not in any way undermine the
protection and assistance that might be due to refugees.
As the case studies in this Article show, the factual
circumstances of IDPs and refugees in almost all parts of
Africa are almost always identical. It is often difficult to
determine who has crossed an international boundary and
who has not, given the nature of the boundaries and the
ever-changing nature of migratory patterns. Any attempt
to predicate protection and assistance on the fact of
crossing an international boundary in the African context
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thus seems arbitrary. Under these circumstances, the
legal recognition of the special protection needs of IDPs is
a step forward, not backward.
(5) The substantive provisions of the AU Convention are, by
and large, predicated on the UN Guiding Principles.
Unlike the UN Guiding Principles, however, the AU
Convention approaches the rights from the perspective of
the carrier of the corresponding obligations-the staterather than from the perspective of the right-holders-the
individuals. This formulation undermines the clarity that
the AU Convention seeks to offer, but it may be a
byproduct of an effort to convert soft law into hard law.
The confusion that this formulation might create will
hopefully be clarified through judicial interpretation as
enforcement is sought and jurisprudence is developed.
(6) The formulation of some provisions of the AU Convention
First, Article 6 provides for the
is disappointing.
and
international
organizations
obligations
of
humanitarian agencies. 531 Unlike the UN Guiding
Principles, however, it does not provide for their rights.5 32
Second, Article 10 provides for the obligations of states to
With
prevent development-induced displacement.5 33
respect to the exceptions, however, it substitutes the UN
Guiding Principles' standard of "compelling and
overriding public interest"534 with the glaringly
permissive language of "States Parties, as much as
possible, shall prevent displacement caused by projects
carried out by public or private actors."535 Finally, Article
14 provides for mechanisms of monitoring compliance.53 6
While it purports to establish a Conference of States that
would monitor compliance, it neither clearly defines the
mandate of that Conference nor provides for an
independent agency for the coordination of the protection
and assistance of IDPs and the monitoring of
These are shortcomings that an
compliance.53 7
531.
AU Convention, supra note 9, art. 6.
532.
See, e.g., Guiding Principles, supra note 8, princ. 25(2) ("International
humanitarian organizations and other appropriate actors have the right to offer their
services in support of the internally displaced.").
533.
AU Convention, supra note 9, art. 10.
534.
Guiding Principles, supra note 8, prin. 6(c).
535.
AU Convention, supra note 9, art. 10(1).
536.
Id. art. 14.
537.
Although the hesitation to mandate an international agency to intervene in
an IDPs situation, which is essentially a domestic affair, is understandable, the
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amendment could rectify whenever the political will is
garnered.
(7) There are no more obstacles to the enforcement of the
provisions of the AU Convention than there are to the
enforcement of any of the other human rights and
humanitarian law treaties. Rather, the clarity that the
AU Convention adds to the obligations of states makes
enforcement that much easier and that much more
probable.
(8) Given some of the recent positive developments in the
African human rights enforcement regime, several
enforcement options could be envisioned. The most
effective enforcement mechanism is individual access to
judicial remedy. Unfortunately, however, this mechanism
is nonexistent as of the writing of this Article, because no
state has accepted the ACJHR's jurisdiction to entertain
submissions from individuals and NGOs. 538 For the AU
Convention to have meaningful impact, the contracting
states must consider accepting the court's jurisdiction to
accept individual and NGO complaints when they ratify
or accede to the ACJHR Protocol.
(9) Finally, it is important to emphasize that this regional
effort is a remarkable step forward that could help
As Professor Gerald
manage forced displacement.
Neuman suggests, even if the UN Guiding Principles were
binding, and even if the rights were recognized and
understood in identical terms, regional systems have
significant advantages for several reasons.53 9 First, the
states are more likely to have directly contributed to the
formulation of the instrument and are consequently more
likely to understand their responsibilities. 540 Second, the
states are more likely to trust a regional enforcement
mechanism than "more distant global institutions."54 1
Third, regional norms and institutions are more likely to

agency's mandate could be restricted to intervention in serious IDPs situations. After
all, states sometimes even allow armed peacekeepers to intervene in grave
circumstances.
See African Union Adopts the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of
538.
Justice and Human Rights, INT'L CTR. FOR THE LEG. PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS,

http://www.interights.org/AfricanSingleProtocolAdoptedlindex.htm (last visited on Jan.
5,2011).
See Neuman, supra note 474, at 106 (listing several reasons).
539.
540.
Id.
541.
Id.
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account for historical and cultural backgrounds. 542
Finally, states within the same region are more likely to
face similar socioeconomic and political issues, and as
such, they may be more trusting of those facing similar
For these and similar reasons, if
realities. 543
implemented in good faith, the AU Convention is likely to
be more effective than prior universal efforts in
addressing the phenomenon of forced displacement in
Africa. Therefore, it is an effort that must be lauded, and
all members of the AU must be encouraged to ratify and
effectively implement this important and groundbreaking
Convention. Other regions facing similar problems must
consider adopting a similar measure.

542.
543.

Id.
Id.
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